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This dissertation consists of three studies.
Hidden city ticketing occurs when an indirect flight from city A to city C through con-
nection node city B is cheaper than the direct flight from city A to city B. In this paper, I
build a structural model, collect empirical data, apply global optimization algorithms, and
conduct counterfactual analysis to shed light on policy implications. I find that hidden city
opportunity occurs only when airlines are applying a hub-and-spoke network structure. In
the short run, hidden city ticketing does not necessarily decrease airlines’ expected profits.
Consumer welfare and total surplus always increase. In the long run, for some routes airlines
have the incentive to switch from hub-and-spoke network to a fully-connected one when there
are more passengers informed of hidden city ticketing. Firms always result in lower expected
profits, consumers and the whole society are not necessarily better off.
Global optimization without access to gradient information is a central task to many
econometric applications as the tool to obtain maximum likelihood estimators for very com-
plicated likelihood functions. In this work, we study the problem of coordination between the
multiple “threads” of estimating gradient descent in order to pause or terminate unpromising
threads early. We test our proposed methodology on both synthetic data and real airline
pricing data, and compare with competitive methods including the genetic algorithm and
pattern search. The numerical results show the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed
approach.
In my third work, I exploit large changes in the H-1B visa program and examines the
effect of changes in H-1B admission levels on the likelihood that US natives major in STEM
fields. I find some evidence that H-1B population adversely affect natives’ choices in STEM
fields when they enter the college and graduate from it. Female, Male and White subgroups
have been negatively affected, and the native Asian subgroup suffer from the most dramatic
crowd-out effect. Given that the H-1B population share had been more than doubled during
iv
1992 to 2017, the probability of native Asian graduates majoring in STEM fields would be
2.56 percentage points larger.
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1.0 Paying More for a Shorter Flight? - Hidden City Ticketing
Hidden city ticketing occurs when an indirect flight from city A to city C through con-
nection node city B is cheaper than the direct flight from city A to city B. Then passengers
traveling from A to B have an incentive to purchase the ticket from A to C but get off
the plane at B. In this paper, I build a structural model to explain the cause and impact
of hidden city ticketing. I collect empirical data from the Skiplagged webpage and apply
global optimization algorithms to estimate the parameters of my model. I also conduct
counterfactual analysis to shed some light on policy implications. I find that hidden city op-
portunity occurs only when airlines are applying a hub-and-spoke network structure, under
which they intend to lower their flying costs compared to a fully connected network. I find
that in the short run, hidden city ticketing does not necessarily decrease airlines’ expected
profits. Consumer welfare and total surplus always increase. In the long run, the welfare
outcomes become more complicated. For some routes airlines have the incentive to switch
from hub-and-spoke network to a fully connected one when there are more and more pas-
sengers informed of hidden city ticketing. During this process, firms always result in lower
expected profits, while consumers and the whole society are not necessarily better off.
1.1 Introduction
Hidden city ticketing is an interesting pricing phenomenon occurring after the deregula-
tion of the airline industry in 1978 ([84]). It is an airline booking strategy passengers use
to reduce their flying costs. Hidden city ticketing occurs when an indirect flight from city
A to city C, using city B as the connection node, turns out to be cheaper than the direct
flight from city A to city B. In which case passengers who wish to fly from A to B have an
incentive to purchase the indirect flight ticket, pretend to fly to city C, while disembark at
the connection node B, and discard the remaining segment B to C. When this happens, city
B is called the “hidden city”, and this behavior is then called “hidden city ticketing”.
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Figure 1: An example of hidden city ticketing.
The following real world example (Figure 1) illustrates hidden city ticketing. On Novem-
ber 19, 2018, a direct flight operated by Delta Air Lines flying from Pittsburgh to New York
city cost $218. On the same day, for the same departure and landing time, another indirect
flight also operated by Delta Air Lines flying from Pittsburgh to Boston, with one stop at
New York city, cost only $67.
These two flights share exactly the same first segment: they are operated by the same
airline company, they departure at the same date, same airports and same time. However,
the price of the indirect flight accounted for only 30% of that of the direct one. That is, you
are able to fly more than 200 miles further but pay $151 less! The New York city is then
called a “hidden city” in this case. It is “hidden” because literally, if we use Google Flights,
Orbitz, Priceline, Kayak, or any other “normal” travel search tools to look for a flight from
Pittsburgh to NYC, we will not be able to see the indirect flight above showing up in our
search results.
Although technically legal, hidden city ticketing actually violates the airfare rules of most
airline companies in United States. For example, according to the Contract of Carriage of
United Airlines (revised by December 31, 2015):
“Fares apply for travel only between the points for which they are published. Tickets may
not be purchased and used at fare(s) from an initial departure point on the Ticket which is
before the Passenger’s actual point of origin of travel, or to a more distant point(s) than the
2
Passenger’s actual destination being traveled even when the purchase and use of such Tickets
would produce a lower fare. This practice is known as “Hidden Cities Ticketing” or “Point
Beyond Ticketing” and is prohibited by UA.”
Similarly, American Airlines also claim that conducting hidden city ticketing is “uneth-
ical” and doing so “is tantamount to switching price tags to obtain a lower price on goods
sold at department stores”. Passengers might be penalized when conducting hidden city
ticketing. Airlines are able to “confiscate any unused Flight Coupons”, “delete miles in the
passenger’s frequent flyer account”, “assess the passenger for the actual value of the ticket”,
or even “take legal action with respect to the passenger”.
Meanwhile, members of Congress have proposed several bills, including “H.R. 700, H.R.
2200, H.R. 5347 and S. 2891, H.R. 332, H.R. 384, H.R. 907 and H.R. 1074”, trying to prohibit
airlines from penalizing passengers for conducting hidden city ticketing ([38]). Furthermore,
the European Union has passed a passenger bill of rights since around 2005, in which the
European Commission has specifically ruled that “airlines must honor any part of an airline
ticket” and hidden city ticketing then becomes perfectly legal. After the ruling EU find that
“fares have become more fair, hidden city bargains are difficult to find, and the airlines have
not suffered drastic losses due to this”.
Therefore, whether hidden city ticketing should be legally prohibited or not, and what
policy does the best for consumers, airline companies, and social welfare, still remain to be
open questions. The fact is, although being “threatened” by airline companies, there have
been more and more consumers coming to realize the existence of hidden city opportunities,
and may try to exploit them to lower their flying costs. In December 2014, United Airlines
and Orbitz (an airline booking platform) sued the founder of Skiplagged (a travel search
tool) for his website of “helping travelers find cheap tickets through hidden city ticketing”.
According to CNNMoney, Orbitz eventually settled out of court one year later, and a Chicago
judge threw out United’s lawsuit using the excuse that the founder “did not live or do business
in that city”. In contrast to the willingness of United, this lawsuit brought the search of key
words “hidden city ticketing” to a peak (Figure 2).
Corresponding to this higher demand, nowadays there are more travel search tools specif-
ically designed to achieve this task (Skiplagged, Tripdelta, Fly Shortcut, AirFareIQ, ITA
3
Figure 2: Average monthly web search data of hidden city ticketing. Data source for the
relative value is Google Trends. Numbers represent search interest relative to the highest
point on the chart for the given region and time. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for
the term. Data source for the absolute value is Google AdWords, unit is number of times.
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Matrix, etc). And finding hidden city opportunies and exploiting them become much easier
today.
This paper aims at providing some plausible explanations for the cause of hidden city
ticketing, and estimating its possible impact on welfare outcomes for airlines, consumers, and
society as a whole. I build a structural model in which airlines can choose both prices and
network structures as their strategic variables following [74], and derive several propositions
based on that. Then I collect daily flights information by scraping the Skiplagged website
to build my own empirical dataset. I apply global optimization algorithms to estimate the
parameters of my model, and then conduct counterfactual analysis to evaluate the possible
impact of hidden city ticketing on airlines’ expected profits, consumers’ welfare, and total
surplus, based on which I could help shed some light on policy implications.
In this paper, I find that 1) hidden city ticketing only occurs when airline companies
are applying a hub-and-spoke network structure; 2) under some conditions, hub-and-spoke
network is more cost-saving compared to fully connected network; 3) in the short run, hidden
city ticketing does not necessarily decrease airlines’ expected profits, while consumers’ surplus
and total welfare always increase; 4) in the long run, i.e., when airlines can change their
choices of prices and networks freely, the impact of hidden city ticketing differs for different
routes. For some routes airlines have the incentive to switch from hub-and-spoke network
to a fully connected one when there are more and more passengers informed of hidden
city ticketing, during which process firms always result in lower expected revenue, while
consumers and the whole society are not necessarily better off. Therefore, whether hidden
city ticketing should be permitted or forbidden depends on the characteristics of different
routes, and this problem cannot be solved by one simple policy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Related works are summarized in
Section 3.2. The structural model is introduced in Section 1.3, together with the propositions
of short run impacts derived from it. Section 1.4 describes the data in details. Section 1.5
shows the estimation strategy and the MLE results. In Section 1.6 I conduct counterfactual
analysis to shed some light on long run impacts and policy implications. The limitation and
future questions of this paper are discussed in Section 1.7 and Section 1.8 concludes.
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1.2 Literature Review
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to quantitatively study the cause and
impact of hidden city ticketing on welfare outcomes using real empirical data. In fact, there
are only a few papers paying attention to this phenomenon. One government report from the
Government Accountability Office ([38]) conducted some correlation analysis based on their
selected data, and found that the possibility of hidden city ticketing is significantly affected
by the size of the markets and the degree of competition in the hub markets and the spoke
markets. Another report from Hopper Research ([79]) also provides some summary statistics
of this phenomenon. Based on four weeks of airfare search data from Hopper, the analyst
found that 26% of domestic routes could be substituted by some cheaper options through
hidden city ticketing, and the price discount could be nearly 60%. The most quantitative
study is [84], which applied a network revenue management model to look at the cause and
impact of hidden city ticketing. They base all their findings on simulated data rather than
real world data. Therefore, their model is quite different from an economic model. They
find that hidden city opportunity may arise when the price elasticity of demand on different
routes differ a lot. In order to eliminate any hidden city opportunities, airlines will rise the
prices of certain itineraries and hurt consumers. But even airlines optimally react, they will
still suffer from a loss in revenue.
There has been a large literature focusing on the airline industry ever since its deregula-
tion in 1978. A bunch of them have confirmed significant difference of price elasticity lying
between tourists and business travelers. For example, [12] has estimated a price elasticity
of demand for tourists as −6.55, while that for business travelers is only −0.63. [71] find
a large difference between price elasticity of demand for business travelers (−0.9 to −0.3)
and that for leisure travelers (about −1.5). And [39] also confirm that the demand for busi-
ness travelers is less price elastic than that of tourists, and through applying certain ticket
restrictions, airline companies are able to distinguish between these two types. Based on
these findings, researchers have further found that airlines are exploiting these differences
and engaging in second-degree price discrimination through many different methods, such
as advanced-purchase discounts ([34]), ticket restrictions such as Saturday-night stayover
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requirements ([78]; [41]), refundable and non-refundable tickets ([36]), intertemporal price
discrimination ([54, 52]), and even the day-of-the-week that a ticket is purchased ([67]). This
paper follows previous findings and assumes that airline companies are price discriminating
between leisure travelers and business travelers, with the latter being less price sensitive and
valuing time more. My model also follows [74] book about economics of network industries,
assuming that airlines can choose both airfares and network structures. Finally, I find that
while informed passengers could possibly enjoy some benefits of hidden city ticketing, unin-
formed passengers are always bearing the costs, if any. This is similar to the finding of [83]
where the author shows some “detrimental externalities” that uninformed consumers suffer
from due to the behavior of informed consumers.
1.3 The Model
Following [74], I assume that airlines are choosing from two different network struc-
tures: fully-connected network or hub-and-spoke network (Figure 3). Under fully-connected
network, passengers fly nonstop from one city to the other. While under hub-and-spoke
network, everyone who wishes to fly from city A to city C needs to stop at the hub city
B. To simplify my analysis below, I will apply an one-way traveling pattern instead of the
two-way traveling pattern showed in Figure 3. After the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act, the
absence of price and entry controls led to increased use of the hub-and-spoke structure ([74]).
Responding to the increased competition and to reduce flying costs, airlines started to cut
the number of direct flights and reroute the passengers through a hub city. While in recent
years, especially since late 1990s, with the expansion of low-cost carriers (LCCs), passengers
started to show a higher aversion toward connecting flights, and fully-connected structure
becomes more popular again ([12]).
Assume that there is only one airline serving the three cities, thus the firm charges
monopoly airfares. Aircrafts are further assumed to have an unlimited capacity, thus there
is only one flight on each route. C2 denote the airline’s cost per mile on any route j. This
simplified cost pattern is referred as ACM cost (AirCraft Movement cost) in [74], and it is
7
Figure 3: Left: fully-connected (FC) network. Right: hub-and-spoke (HS) network.
widely used in airline related literature. Cost pattern can be simplified because in airline
industry, large percentage of costs are fixed before flights taking off, such as capital costs
(renting gates for departure and arrival, landing fees), labor costs (hiring local staff), etc.
([38]) The costs of fuel account for approximately 15% of the total operation costs ([12]),
while the marginal cost of airline seats is nearly negligible ([68]).
Assume that direct flight has a quality of qh per mile and indirect flight has a quality of
ql per mile, with 0 < ql < qh < 1. Each individual i has a time preference parameter of λi,
obtaining utility
ui = C1 · eλiqd− p
from consuming a good of quality q. Under the assumption of free disposal, he/she will get 0
utility if chooses not to fly. Utility decreases when price increases. And if a passenger values
time more (i.e., with a larger λ), he/she will acquire a larger utility increase when switching
from an indirect flight (with quality ql) to a direct flight (with quality qh). Furthermore, for
a longer itinerary (larger d), the utility improvement from indirect flight to direct flight is
also larger. C1 is a scaling parameter to make the utility comparable to dollar value p.
On each route j, the distribution of consumers’ time preferences satisfies λij ∼ N(θj, σ21).
For passengers flying from A to B, the fraction of passengers being aware of hidden city
opportunities is δ, and the fraction of uninformed passengers is 1 − δ. When hidden city
opportunities exist (i.e., pAB > pABC), informed passengers will pay pABC instead, while
uninformed passengers will still pay pAB. The amount of passengers on each route j are




pFC = (pAB, pBC , pAC)
Fully-Connected
ΠHS(pHS)
pHS = (pAB, pBC , pABC)
Hub-and-Spoke
Figure 4: Airline chooses network structures and prices to maximize expected profits.
An airline chooses both network structures (fully-connected or hub-and-spoke) and prices
(pAB, pBC , pAC , pABC) to maximize expected profits, as shown in Figure 4.
I will show later in this section that there exists an optimal choice set for the airline,
and the choice set is unique. According to the assumptions above, on each route j, for each
individual i,
uij = C1 · eλijqd− p, λij ∼ N(θj, σ21).
Therefore, on each route j, the proportion of consumers choosing to fly is equal to:
Pr [uij ≥ 0] = Pr
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Under fully-connected network, airline’s expected profits (producer surplus) are equal to
the revenue it collects minus the costs:






























− C2 · dAC .
Under fully-connected network structure, the only way to fly “indirectly” from A to C is
to take the two direct flights A to B and B to C together. Obviously, with pAB < pAB +pBC ,
we can easily derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Hidden city opportunity does not exist under fully-connected network struc-
ture.
Consumer surplus is the difference between our willingness to pay and the price we
actually being charged, which equals:


















) (C1 · eλiqhdAC − pAC) dF (λi).
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Adding them together, our total surplus under fully-connected network is:


















) (C1 · eλiqhdAC) dF (λi)− C2 · dAC .
No transaction fee is assumed under the setting, thus the prices we pay are equal to the
prices airline receives, and both cancel out.
1.3.2 Hub-and-Spoke Network (without Hidden City Ticketing)
Given hub-and-spoke network structure, first consider the simple case when hidden city
opportunities do not exist (i.e., pAB ≤ pABC). Under this circumstances, airline’s expected
profits are equal to:































Proposition 2. If the cost associated with maintaining route AC is sufficiently large, then
the hub-and-spoke network is more profitable to operate than the fully-connected network for
the monopoly airline.
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Proof. Proof of Proposition 2. Compare airline’s expected profits under these two different
networks:


















+ C2 · dAC .
Therefore, if the last term (C2 · dAC , refers to the cost associated with maintaining route
AC) is sufficiently large, hub-and-spoke network is more profitable.
This is in accordance with the findings of previous literatures. [30], [23], [24], and [11]
all confirm the cost economies of hubbing. Under a different framework, [74] also find that
hub-and-spoke network is cost-saving if the fixed cost is large enough.
Similarly, consumer surplus equals:


















) (C1 · eλiqldABC − pABC) dF (λi).
Adding them together, total surplus is equal to:


















) (C1 · eλiqldABC) dF (λi).
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1.3.3 Hub-and-Spoke Network (with Hidden City Ticketing)
Now consider the scenario when hidden city opportunities exist (i.e., pAB > pABC).
Firstly, is there a possibility that pAB > pABC , in other words, are we paying more for a


















































where C is a constant.









, to find out the maximizer p∗, take derivative of
f(p, θ) with respect to p and make it equal 0:





























, and take derivative of g(p, θ) with
respect to θ, we get

































> 0, if θ > ln(
p
C
)− 1, we would have gθ(p, θ) > 0, hence as long as
θAB > θABC , the optimal prices would be pAB > pABC . Therefore, under some conditions,
there is a possibility that pAB > pABC , in other words, we are paying more for a shorter flight
sometimes and hidden city opportunities exist. The underlying explanation is that airlines
are pricing based on demand, rather than costs.
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Comparing to Section 3.2 where there is no hidden city ticketing, the difference lies in
the informed passengers who wish to fly directly from A to B. Under this circumstances,
airline’s expected profits are equal to:
ΠHCT = ΠAB + ΠBC + ΠABC







































Proposition 3. When airlines do not alter their choices of prices and network structures,
hidden city ticketing does not necessarily decrease airline’s expected profits.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 3. Compare airline’s expected profits with and without hidden
city ticketing respectively, and compute the difference:





















Note that pABC < pAB while [1 − ΦθAB ,σ21(ln(
pABC
C1 · qhdAB




We find that although airline suffers from a loss when informed passengers are paying a lower
price, it also obtains some gain when this lower price attracts more consumers to take the
flight. How hidden city ticketing will affect airline’s expected profits actually depends on the




























) (C1 · eλiqhdAB − pABC) dF (λi).
Proposition 4. When airlines do not alter their choices of prices and network structures,
consumers are always better off when hidden city ticketing is allowed.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 4. Compute the difference of consumer surplus with and without
hidden city ticketing, we have

























) (pAB − pABC) dF (λi) > 0.
The increase in consumer surplus is composed of two different parts. Firstly, the existing
informed passengers are now paying a lower price, which provides them extra utility gain.
Secondly, some travelers who will not fly with the original price pAB are now participating
in this market activity, because they are informed of the lower price pABC . These new
passengers also obtain utility gain, increasing the total consumer surplus.
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Adding the producer surplus and consumer surplus together, we have the total surplus
under the scenario of hub-and-spoke network structure with hidden city ticketing being equal
to:























) (C1 · eλiqhdAB) dF (λi).
Proposition 5. When airlines do not alter their choices of prices and network structures,
total social welfare always increase when hidden city ticketing is allowed.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 5. Compute the difference of total surplus with and without
hidden city ticketing, we have



















) (C1 · eλiqhdAB) dF (λi) > 0.
Total surplus increase because compared to the original price pAB, there are more trav-
elers choosing to take the flight with the lower price pABC . Extra passengers obtain extra
utility gain. Since I have assumed unlimited capacity for the aircrafts, the whole society
benefit from this change.
With a full analysis of airline’s expected profits under fully-connected network and hub-
and-spoke network, with and without hidden city ticketing, we can now show that there
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exists an optimal choice set for the airline to maximize its producer surplus, and the solution
is unique.
Proposition 6. Under the assumptions listed at the beginning of this section, there exists
an optimal choice set (network, pAB, pBC , pAC , pABC) for the airline to maximize its expected
profits, and the solution is unique.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 6. According to our previous analysis,





























− C2 · dAC .





























if pAB ≤ pABC , and






































if pAB > pABC .
Note that solving for the optimal choice set (network, pAB, pBC , pAC , pABC) is equivalent
to firstly solving for the optimal price bundles (pAB, pBC , pAC , pABC) under fully-connected
network and hub-and-spoke network respectively, and further compare ΠFC(pAB, pBC , pAC)
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and ΠHS(pAB, pBC , pABC) to determine which joint choices of network structure and prices
are optimal.
Solving for the optimal price bundle (pAB, pBC , pAC , pABC) to maximize expected profits













where C is a constant.






































Let x = ln(
p
C
), y = Φθ,σ2(x), the equation above becomes a typical ODE:
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Figure 5: Illustration of function f(p) with parameters
θ = 0.5, σ = 0.3, C = 10, q = 0.8, d = 30.








C · q · d
))]
is unimodal, I depict function f(p) with parameters θ =
0.5, σ = 0.3, C = 10, q = 0.8, d = 30, as shown in Figure 5 below.
When there is hidden city ticketing, the difference lies in the optimal value of pABC .































where C1 and C2 are constants.
































Left-hand side is a function of p, f(p) with p ∈ [0,+∞). It is continuous because it is
a linear combination of probability density function and cumulative distribution function of
normal distribution, which are all continuous functions.
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∈ (0, 1). Therefore, f(p) > 0. When














∈ (0, 1). Therefore, f(p) < 0. According
to Mean Value Theorem, there exists at least one p that makes f(p) = 0. Therefore, the
solution of the model still exists.
Note that Propositions 3, 4 and 5 are derived under the assumption that airlines are not
aware of hidden city ticketing, thus they do not alter their choices of prices and network
structures in reaction to this booking strategy. This might be valid in the short run, while
during a longer period, airlines should be able to realize the conduct of hidden city ticketing
and adjust their optimal choices of prices and networks in response to the behavior. In such
a scenario, obtaining a closed-form solution is challenging, and to reveal what would be the
airline’s optimal choice set with a changing proportion of informed passengers (changing δ) is
even more difficult. Therefore, in the rest of the paper I will use numerical approach instead
to solve for the optimal choices of airline with changing δ, and estimate the possible impacts
of hidden city ticketing on welfare outcomes in the counterfactual analysis below.
1.4 Data
I have collected daily flights data by scraping the tickets information on Skiplagged
webpage on February 6, 2016 with all quotes of April 6, 2016. This date was chosen because
it was neither a weekend nor a holiday, and it was 60 days before the departure date, which
should not be severely affected by seat sales. Information being collected include the origin,
connecting (if any) and destination airports, time of departure, connection and landing,
operation airlines and airfares.
According to the Passenger Boardings at Commercial Service Airports of Year 2014
released in September 2015 by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), there are more than
500 commercial service airports around United States. To reduce the computational burden
of collecting data, I have restricted my sample to the 133 busy commercial service airports
identified by FAA. Only focusing on those 133 airports is reasonable because those airports
20
                                                  
Figure 6: Distribution of busy commercial service airports around United States.
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actually accounted for 96.34% of total passenger enplanements in 2014. The distribution
of the busy commercial service airports around United States is shown in Figure 6. From
the graph we can see that my data has covered airports in Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico,
while no airport in Wyoming has been identified as busy commercial service airport in my
analysis.
Overall, my sample has 16,142 routes (airport A to airport B) and 2,822,086 itineraries
(flight from A to B with specific information of time, connection node, operation airline(s)
and airfare(s)). Flights are operated by 45 different airline companies, among which 11
companies show some hidden city opportunities lying in the itineraries they operate.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no official definition of hidden city opportunity in
existing literatures. [38] define that “a hidden-city ticketing opportunity exists for business
travelers if the difference in airfares between the hub market and the spoke airport was $100
or more, and for leisure passengers if the difference in airfares was $50 or more”. In this
paper, I have constructed two intuitive definitions of hidden city opportunity myself and
listed below.
Definition 1. Hidden city opportunity exists if the cheapest non-stop ticket of that itinerary
is still more expensive than some indirect flight ticket with the direct destination as a con-
nection node.
Definition 2. Hidden city opportunity exists if the non-stop ticket is more expensive than
some indirect flight ticket which shares exactly the same first segment of that itinerary.
The example being illustrated at the beginning of this paper belongs to the second
scenario. And the second definition is also the one being defined in [84].
According to the daily flights data I have collected, these two definitions show similar
magnitude with respect to hidden city opportunities. For example, among all the itineraries,
the first definition indicates a total of 366,754 (13.00%) flights and 1,095 (6.78%) routes
that exhibit possible hidden city opportunities. Those amounts of Definition 2 are 394,544
(13.98%) flights and 1,316 (8.15%) routes respectively. This magnitude is slightly smaller
compared to the findings in [38], in which the authors find that among the selected markets
for six major U.S. passenger airlines in their data, 17% provided such opportunities. Table 1
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Table 1: Top 10 origin-destination pairs with most hidden city itineraries.
Popularity Origin Destination # of Itineraries % under Def.1 % under Def.2
1 ISP PHL 11105 3.03% 2.81%
2 SRQ CLT 8590 2.34% 2.18%
3 CAK CLT 5948 1.62% 1.51%
4 GRR ORD 5733 1.56% 1.45%
5 MSN ORD 5640 1.54% 1.43%
6 XNA ORD 5529 1.51% 1.40%
7 COS DEN 4000 1.09% 1.01%
8 FSD ORD 3665 1.00% 0.93%
9 CAE CLT 3659 1.00% 0.93%
10 ORF CLT 3540 0.97% 0.90%
shows the top 10 origin-destination pairs with most hidden city opportunities, which are the
same under both definitions.
Furthermore, the maximum payment reduction would be as large as 89.57% if hidden
city ticketing is allowed. Table 2 shows the top 10 origin-destination pairs with the largest
price differences, which are slightly different under both definitions. These statistics help
reveal the fact that hidden city ticketing might no longer be negligible nowadays and related
research becomes necessary and valuable.
Recall that my primary data contains flights operated by 45 different airline companies,
among which 11 companies shown some hidden city opportunities lying in the itineraries
they operated. Table 3 exhibits the amounts of hidden city itineraries of these airlines unber
both definitions. We can see that the three largest airlines: American Airlines, Delta Air
Lines and United Airlines operated more than 99% of those itineraries. This is similar to
the findings of [79], in which he found that 96% of those hidden city discounts came from
American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, United Airlines and Alaska Airlines. All of them are
major hub-and-spoke carriers and apply a hub-and-spoke network business model.
A notable exception is Southwest Airlines, where no hidden city opportunity is found
in the itineraries operated by it, and whose fare rules actually do not specifically prohibit
the practice of hidden city ticketing. Since Southwest Airlines is a typical operator of fully-
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Table 2: Top 10 origin-destination pairs with largest price differences.
Definition 1 Definition 2
Origin Destination % Saving Origin Destination % Saving
LGA IAH 89.57% LGA IAH 89.57%
CLE IAH 88.49% CLE IAH 88.49%
PHL DTW 87.54% PHL DTW 87.54%
IAH EWR 86.61% MKE MSP 86.65%
IAH IAD 86.36% IAH EWR 86.61%
DTW PHL 86.20% IAH IAD 86.36%
KOA SFO 85.87% DTW PHL 86.20%
SNA SLC 85.46% KOA SFO 85.87%
ICT MSP 85.38% SNA SLC 85.46%
CLE EWR 85.03% ICT MSP 85.38%
Table 3: Number of hidden city itineraries of different airlines.
Airline IATA Code Def.1: # of Itineraries (%) Def.2: # of Itineraries (%)
American Airlines AA 203096 (55.38%) 210287 (53.30%)
Delta Air Lines DL 93062 (25.38%) 106867 (27.09%)
United Airlines UA 69587 (18.98%) 76175 (19.31%)
Alaska Airlines AS 598 (0.16%) 666 (0.17%)
Hawaiian Airlines HA 221 (0.06%) 221 (0.06%)
Frontier Airlines F9 56 (0.02%) 157 (0.04%)
JetBlue Airways B6 48 (0.01%) 106 (0.03%)
Virgin America VX 29 (0.01%) 36 (0.01%)
Silver Airways 3M 11 (0.00%) 11 (0.00%)
Spirit Airlines NK 8 (0.00%) 11 (0.00%)
Sun Country Airlines SY 7 (0.00%) 7 (0.00%)
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connected network, this finding in the real data is in accordance with my previous proposition
that hidden city opportunity does not exist under fully-connected network structure.
1.5 Estimation
To estimate the parameters of my model, firstly I retrieve all the ordered triplets (A-B-C)
from my primary dataset. Then, with all the observed information of prices, distances and
consumers’ preferences, I choose the parameters of my model to maximize the likelihood of
observed airlines’ choices of network structures. In order to deal with this implicit maximum
likelihood function, I have applied global optimization algorithms, more specifically, Pattern
Search to solve the MLE and estimate the parameters.
1.5.1 Sample Construction
To build my own sample, the first step is to retrieve ordered triplets (A-B-C) from the
133 busy commercial service airports of my primary dataset. The triplet needs to satisfy the
following three conditions: 1) it must include direct flight from A to B; 2) it must include
direct flight from B to C; 3) it must include either direct or one-stop indirect flight from A
to C using B as the connection node.
In total, I have obtained 114,635 ordered triplets from my dataset that satisfy the condi-
tions listed above. Based on the differences in condition 3), I divide them into three different
types. Type I includes only direct flight from A to C with a subsample size of 26,198. To
estimate pABC of Type I, I add observed pAB and pBC up manually. Type II includes only
indirect flight from A to C through B with a subsample size of 61,092. To estimate pAC
of Type II, I use the observed pAB and assume flights from A to B and A to C share the
same price per mile: pAC =
pAB
dAB
· dAC . Type III includes both direct flight from A to C
and indirect flight from A to C through B, with a subsample size of 27,345. d represents
geodesic distance computed based on the longitude and latitude of the pair-airports provided
by Google Maps.
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On each route j, assume that θj ∼ N(µj, σ22). Recall that each individual i has a time
preference parameter of λi and on each route j, the distribution of consumers’ time prefer-
ences satisfies λij ∼ N(θj, σ21). Therefore, µj measures the dependency of the destination
city on business travelers. Previous literature have constructed several indexes to capture
this characteristic. For example, [17] and [20] built a tourism index at the MSA level based
on the ratio of hotel income to total personal income. [23] and [78] assumed that the dif-
ference in January temperature between origin and destination cities could serve as a proxy
for tourism. [39] segmented their data into “leisure routes” and “big-city routes” based on
the ratio of accommodation earnings to total nonfarm earnings.
In this paper, I have constructed my own index based on [19] and data provided by
TripAdvisor. [19] provides an index of the share of commercial airline travel to and from
cities that is for business purposes, which is based on the 1995 American Travel Survey.
This index was also used as one of the measures in [67] to distinguish between “leisure” and
“mixed” routes. The shortage for this index is that it only includes data for each state and
metropolitan statistical area, while city level data might be a better fit corresponding to the
location of an airport. To solve this problem, I have also collected data from TripAdvisor
(the largest travel site in the world) for each city, and compute the average number of the
reviews of hotels/lodging, vocation rentals, things to do, restaurants, and posts of forum,
standardized by the city population from 2010 census. The underlying assumption is that
a larger number of reviews on TripAdvisor might be an indicator of being more popular
among leisure travelers, and this city-level data together with the indices constructed by
[19] should be able to provide more complete information of the city’s characteristics. After
taking exponential of the opposite of the average number from TripAdvisor’s review data,
I compute the mean of that and the indices from [19] (both state-level and MSA-level) and
get µ.
From Figure 7 we can see that the largest µ = 0.7450 belongs to Dallas Fort Worth
International Airport (DFW) in Texas, while Ellison Onizuka Kona International Airport
(KOA) on the Island of Hawaii has the smallest µ = 0.0773. In general, places that are
more popular among tourists, such as Orlando, Puerto Rico and Hawaii, get the smaller
µ(s). While places such as Dallas, Austin and Chicago that are more attractive to business
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travelers have larger µ(s).
1.5.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Overall, I have a set of 7 parameters: ζ = (δ, C1, C2, σ1, σ2, qh, ql), with δ ∈ [0, 1] as
my parameter of interest, and the others are nuisance parameters. Observed attributes
in my dataset include the prices, distances, and time preference indices on each route:
xi = (pAB,BC,AC,ABC , dAB,BC,AC,ABC , µAB,BC,AC,ABC). And observed decision variable is the
airline’s network choices: yi ∈ {FC,HS}.
The maximum likelihood estimation needs to be processed in 2 steps. Firstly, I sam-
ple θAB,BC,AC,ABC from the normal distribution N|xi,σ2 . Then airline makes a decision to
maximize expected profits:
yi = arg max
y∈{FC,HS}
Π(xi, y, ζ).
The maximum likelihood estimation problem is therefore:







with the probabilistic model as
Pr[yi = y|xi, ζ] = Pr
θ∼N |xi,σ2
[Π(xi, y, ζ, θ) ≥ Π(xi,¬y, ζ, θ)] .
1.5.3 Pattern Search
This maximum likelihood estimation is challenging because the likelihood is implicit with
a random sampling in the first step, and the gradient is also difficult to evaluate with respect
to ζ. Here I apply global optimization algorithms to solve this MLE problem. That is, for
each ζt, obtain an estimation of likelihood function:
log p(yi|xi; ζt) = log Pr
θ∼N|xi,σ2











I have tried several global optimization techniques including Pattern Search, Genetic
Algorithm, Simulated Annealing, etc., to get the optimal ζ = (δ, C1, C2, σ1, σ2, qh, ql) that
maximizes my log likelihood function. It turns out that Pattern Search works best in this
case. It costs the shortest time; It achieves the maximum log likelihood; And it obtains quite
similar and robust results when I change the starting point from δ = 0.1, 0.5 to 0.9.
Pattern Search algorithm fits this problem quite well because firstly, it does not require
the calculation of gradients of the objective function, which are quite difficult to compute in
this case. Secondly, it lends itself to constraints and boundaries. For example, it could deal
with the constraint that 0 < ql < qh < 1 quite well in this case.
How does the Pattern Search algorithm operate? Pattern search applies polling method
([60]) to find out the minimum of the objective function. Starting from an initial point,
it firstly generates a pattern of points, typically plus and minus the coordinate directions,
times a mesh size, and center this pattern on the current point. Then, for each point in this
pattern, evaluate the objective function and compare to the evaluation of the current point.
If the minimum objective in the pattern is smaller than the value at the current point, the
poll is successful, and the minimum point found becomes the current point. The mesh size
is then doubled in order to escape from a local minimum. If the poll is not successful, the
current point is retained, and the mesh size is then halved until it falls below a threshold
when the iterations stop. Multiple starting points could be used to insure that a robust
minimum point has been reached regardless of the choice of the initial point.
This algorithm is simple but powerful, provides a robust and straightforward method for
global optimization. It works well for the maximum likelihood function in this paper, which
is derivative-free with constraints and boundaries.
1.5.4 Estimation Results
The estimation results from Pattern Search are shown in Table 4 below.
According to the estimation results, the informed passengers account for around 3.73%
of the whole population. This proportion appeals to be trivial at first glance, but it is not
surprising because those are the travelers who are not only informed of hidden city ticketing,
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Figure 7: Business travel index for each airport as the destination city.










Figure 8: Up: Plot of log likelihood when δ varies from 0 to 1. Below: Plot of log likelihood
when δ varies from 0 to 0.1 (zoom in).
but also exploiting those opportunities, and whose behavior in fact result in affecting the
choices made by airlines. And in the counterfactual analysis section below, I will further
show that even a small fraction of informed passengers will affect airline’s choices of network
structures and prices significantly.
The confidence interval for δ was constructed using the bootstrap method. I run the MLE
for 1,000 times, and for each run, sample the entire data with replacement and construct a
data set of equal size. The sample mean of the 1,000 estimates of the MLE is 0.0296, and the
standard error is the sample standard deviation as 0.0093. We can see that δ is significantly
different from zero at 99% confidence interval.
In Figure 8, I have plotted the log likelihood as a function of δ with all other parameters
being constant at their optimal values. From the figure it is clear that δ = 3.73% is the
global maximizer.
Recall that in my theoretical model, I have assumed that there is only one airline serving
the three cities, thus the firm charges monopoly airfares. [54] also made similar monopoly
assumption in the paper, and corresponding to this assumption, the author refined the data
and only paid attention to the routes with a single carrier operating one or two flights per
day. Following this idea, I also define route AB, BC, AC, or ABC as monopoly if there
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is only one single carrier providing services on that route. Refining my sample of ordered
triplets according to this condition results in a subsample size of 36,645, comparing to the
total sample size of 114,635 before. Applying the same estimation algorithm, I have solved
the MLE problem again based on the monopoly subsample, and get an estimation of δ being
equal to 0.0303. The result is not significantly different from the 0.0373 we obtain above
from the whole sample.
1.6 Counterfactual Analysis
Based on our previous analysis, given a longer horizon, airlines should be able to adjust
their prices and networks in response to hidden city ticketing, in order to maximize their
expected profits. To reveal what would be the airline’s optimal joint choices of prices and
network structures when δ changes, and further estimate the possible impacts of hidden
city ticketing on welfare outcomes, I have conducted several counterfactual analysis using
numerical approach below. Will airline companies always suffer from revenue loss with
hidden city ticketing? Will hidden city ticketing always benifit consumers and social welfare?
Should government enact regulations to clearly prohibit or permit this booking ploy? My
counterfactual experiments will help shed some light on those important policy implications.
Assume that the proportion of informed passengers (δ) increases from 0 to 100%, and air-
line companies always choose optimal prices under different network structures to maximize
their expected profits when δ changes. After obtaining the optimal price bundle p∗ under
different networks, I compute the surplus of producer, consumer, and society according to
our previous analysis in Section 1.3. Then I plot producer surplus (blue), consumer surplus
(red) and total surplus (black) under fully-connected network (dotted line) and hub-and-
spoke network (solid line) respectively, when δ varies.
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1.6.1 Fully-Connected Network Outperforms Hub-and-Spoke Network
Findings 1 Among all the 114,635 data points (i.e., ordered triplets A-B-C), 75,995
(66.29%) have expected profits under fully-connected network being always higher than that
under hub-and-spoke network, regardless of the value of δ.
My first finding is that under major cases, fully-connected network creates higher ex-
pected profits for airlines comparing to hub-and-spoke network, regardless of the propor-
tion of informed passengers. One example would be the ordered triplets MIA→SEA→COS
(Miami International Airport to Seattle-Tacoma International Airport to Colorado Springs
Airport). Figure 9 shows the surplus of producer, consumer, and society with different δ(s).
The dotted lines are always horizonal because according to my model, hidden city ticketing
will not affect the welfare outcomes under fully-connected network structure. It is clear that
in this example, the dotted blue line is always above the solid blue one, regardless of the value
of δ, which means that for airlines operating from Miami International Airport to Colorado
Springs Airport, a direct flight always outperforms an indirect one through Seattle-Tacoma
International Airport. This is not surprising because flying from Miami to Colorado through
Seattle is counter intuitive.
When we plot the surplus in Figure 9, there is a pattern of kink, which is not uncommon
and also found in other examples. Digging deep I find what happens at the kink is that
airlines keep raising the price pABC in response to the increasing proportion of informed
passengers, δ. Consumers benefit at first because more and more informed travelers are able
to exploit the hidden city opportunities, pay lower prices and obtain extra utility. However,
when the kink point is reached, pABC hits the magnitude of pAB and hidden city opportunities
disappear. The informed passengers can no longer obtain extra utility, while since the new
pABC turns out to be higher than the original price without hidden city ticketing, those
passengers flying from A to C through B also get hurt. This is similar to what is called
“detrimental externalities” in [83], in which the author also found that sometimes more
informed consumers would cause the price paid by uninformed consumers to increase. This
finding also helps confirm the concern mentioned in [38] that allowing hidden city ticketing
might lead to unintended consequences, including higher prices.
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Figure 9: Surplus for MIA to SEA to COS (top left), CID to DTW to MSN (top right),
AUS to JFK to RDU (bottom) when δ changes.
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1.6.2 Hub-and-Spoke Network Outperforms Fully-Connected Network
Findings 2 22,551 (19.67%) data points have expected profits under hub-and-spoke net-
work being always higher than that under fully-connected network, regardless of the value of
δ.
Contradict to the previous finding, sometimes the hub-and-spoke network structure al-
ways does a better job achieving higher revenue compared to fully-connected network. One
example would be the ordered triplets CID→DTW→MSN (The Eastern Iowa Airport to De-
troit Metropolitan Airport to Dane County Regional Airport in Madison). Figure 9 shows
the surplus of producer, consumer, and society in this case when δ varies.
We can see that the solid blue line is always above the dotted blue one, regardless of
the value of δ, which means that for airlines flying from The Eastern Iowa Airport to Dane
County Regional Airport in Madison, an indirect flight through Detroit Metropolitan Airport
always outperforms a direct flight. This usually happens when both airports A and C are
small, which is exactly what occurs when you are flying from CID to MSN. In this case, it
might be costly for airlines to provide a direct flight service, especially when compared to
the relatively low demand.
1.6.3 Switch from Hub-and-Spoke Network to Fully-Connected Network
Findings 3 16,089 (14.03%) data points have crossings, which means that airline’s
expected profits are higher under hub-and-spoke network when there are less informed pas-
sengers, while fully-connected network becomes more profitable when δ gets large.
A more interesting story lies in the cases remained: hub-and-spoke network structure
is more profitable when δ is small, but becomes gradually outperformed by fully-connected
network when there are more and more informed passengers. In other words, for some specific
routes, airlines have the incentive to switch from one network structure to another, and δ
will affect companies’ network choices. This finding could be supported by what we called
“dehubbing” phenomenon in recent years ([11]). For example, Delta closed its Dallas-Fort
Worth International Airport (DFW) hub in year 2005 and reduced the number of flights at
its Cincinnati hub by 26% in the same year. And Pittsburgh was also downgraded from a
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hub to a “focus city” by US Airways in 2004.
One example would be the ordered triplets AUS→JFK→RDU (Austin–Bergstrom In-
ternational Airport to JFK to Raleigh–Durham International Airport). Figure 9 shows the
surplus of producer, consumer, and society in this case when δ varies.
We can see that the solid blue line crosses the dotted blue one at the point when δ is
around 6%, which means that when δ is smaller than the threshhold, airline would pursue
hub-and-spoke network structure. While when there are more and more informed passengers
and δ crosses the threshhold, airline has the incentive to switch from the hub-and-spoke
network to fully-connected network, and this decision will also affect both consumer surplus
and total surplus dramatically. In this example, after the airline company making the change,
both consumer surplus and total surplus increase a lot, which refer to the increase from the
solid red, black lines to the dotted red, black lines respectively. But this is not always the
case, and we will see more details later in this paper.
The crossing point varies for different ordered triplets. This is because different routes
have different characteristics and attract different types of travelers. Some routes would be
quite “sensitive” to hidden city ticketing and airlines operating on those routes would switch
from hub-and-spoke network to fully-connected network when δ is relatively small. Some
routes would have operating airlines changing their network choices only when the amount of
informed passengers are large enough. And we have already known that sometimes airlines
will never change to the fully-connected network (Findings 2), while in other cases they will
stick to the fully-connected network from the very beginning (Findings 1). To have a more
complete idea about the impact of different δ(s) on airlines’ network choices, I can always
depict the graph of surplus for every ordered triplet in my data. However, it is impossible
to display all those figures here (recall that I have as many as 114,635 data points in total).
Therefore, in Figure 10 I have plotted the distribution of all the crossing points when δ
changes.
We can see that even a small δ matters. Airlines’ choices can be affected significantly
even with a quite small proportion of informed passengers. For example, airlines would
switch from hub-and-spoke network to fully-connected network on nearly 1,000 routes with
only 1% of informed passengers, and further change their choices on another 900 routes if
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Figure 10: Distribution of crossings when δ changes (pmf).
the proportion increases to 2%. Recall that we have obtained an estimation of δ = 3.73% in
Section 1.5, which appeals to be trivial at first glance, but in fact, 3% of informed passengers
could affect airlines’ choices of network structures on approximately 2,700 routes (out of
16,089 in my whole sample), and this amount of routes being affected would increase to
around 3,600 when the proportion of informed passengers increase to 4%. To make this
illustration clearer, I have also drawn the cumulative distribution function of the crossing
points when δ varies from 0 to 1, and obtain my next finding from the following Figure 11.
Findings 4 Airlines have the incentive to switch from hub-and-spoke network to fully-
connected network for half of the routes when there are approximately 10% of informed pas-
sengers, and for 75% of the routes when δ is only around 19%.
Recall that after airlines changing their choices of network structures, consumers and
the whole society are not always better off. After comparing the consumer surplus and total
surplus before and after the change for all those 16,089 routes, I am able to further conclude
that:
Findings 5 If airlines switch from hub-and-spoke network to fully-connected network, un-
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Figure 11: Distribution of crossings when δ changes (cdf).
der 11,458 cases (71.22%) consumer surplus is going to increase, and under 11,128 (69.17%)
cases total surplus is going to increase.
In other words, unlike what could be derived from the theoretical model when airlines
do not alter their choices of network structures and airfares in the short run, during a
longer horizon, firms would actively react to the conduct of hidden city ticketing and change
their optimal choices. This will result in different welfare outcomes for producer, consumer,
and whole society compared to the propositions in Section 1.3. What I have found in my
counterfactual analysis is that, during this process, firms always result in lower expected
profits, while consumers and the whole society are not necessarily better off. One possible
explanation would be that the conduct of hidden city ticketing weakens the airlines’ ability
of price discrimination. Therefore, enacting a simple regulation for prohibiting or permitting
the conduct of hidden city ticketing would be difficult.
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1.7 Discussion
There are some limitations and future questions remained in this paper. Firstly, I have
made a critical assumption in my model that there is only one airline serving the three
cities, thus the firm charges monopoly airfares. The monopoly assumption is not uncommon
in airline related literatures, but some researchers believe that after the deregulation, the
US airline industry should be characterized as being hightly oligopolistic ([74]). And in
[38], the authors also find that “hidden city opportunities may arise when a greater amount
of competition exists for travel between spoke communities than on routes to and from
hub communities, and where airfares in those markets reflect such competition”. In other
words, besides the factors I have raised in my propositions, competition might be another
possible cause of hidden city ticketing, which does not enter my model under the monopoly
assumption. And given competition, besides the cost-saving effect, another advantage of
hub-and-spoke network compared to fully-connected network would be that airlines could
have stronger market power in the hub, which helps them increase the entry barrier and drive
up the prices for the origin-hub passengers. Since there are business travelers who favor the
origin-hub route and appeal to be price-inelastic, this market power of raising prices could
result in higher profits for the hubbing airlines. ([17], [18])
Another interesting question raised by [83] is that does it pay to be informed? If this is
true, a better way to take this into consideration might be assuming that it is possible to
become fully informed by paying a fixed cost C. Conducting hidden city tickeing is definitely
costly. Passengers are “threatened” by the airline companies and need to “bear some risk”
to conduct this behavior. As I have quoted from the contract of carriage in Section 3.1,
consumers will be penalized if being caught. And hidden city ticketing might be treated
as “unethical” and a breach of the contract between passengers and the airlines. There are
also possible negative externalities such as causing delays of the other passengers because of
waiting and double checking baggages. Furthermore, the condition of conducting hidden city
ticketing is also highly restrictive. For example, if you have luggage that is not carry-on, you
are not able to leave the flight earlier without picking up your bag. Normally, your checked
baggage will be delivered to your final destination directly rather than to your connection
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city. Also, you cannot conduct hidden city ticketing for the first segment of your round-trip.
Your second trip will be cancelled if you missed the connection of the first one. Besides, you
might need to bear the risk that you are switched to another flight because of initial flight
being cancelled or overbooked, with the same origin and destination airports, but bypass the
connection city. Therefore, cost incurred to be informed might be a reasonable assumption
when studying hidden city ticketing in the future, while measuring this cost would still be
challenging.
Furthermore, airlines claim in the news that in reaction to the booking ploy of hidden
city ticketing, they might choose to charge more on flights, stop offering some flights, and re-
calibrate their no show algorithms. My analysis successfully predicts the increase in airfares
of some flights. But since I have assumed that airline companies are choosing between
fully-connected network and hub-and-spoke network, I do not provide an outside option for
airlines to stop offering the flights for certain routes. Instead of raising the prices of flights to
eliminate hidden city ticketing, another possibility is that the airlines could stop serving those
defective routes. This is also another major concern in [38] that allowing hidden city ticketing
might result in unintended decreasing service. Including this outside option could help make
the analysis more complete, although the magnitude might be difficult to evaluate without
a good measure of the costs. Another concern raised by purchasing hidden city tickets is
related to logistics and public-safety. When hidden city ticketing becomes more popular,
airlines might need to re-calibrate their no show algorithms. They might have the incentive
to oversell more, which is an act that could turn problematic and expensive if the estimates
are wrong. Unfortunately, I did not find the dataset of airlines’ oversales. Related statistics
provided by United States Department of Transportation are numbers of passengers boarded
and denied boarding by the U.S. Air Carriers. Figure 12 shows the percentage of passengers
being denied boarding by the U.S. Air Carriers because of oversales, both voluntarily and
involuntarily, from year 1990 to 2019.
From Figure 12 we can see a declining trend of percentage of passengers being denied
boarding because of oversales in recent years, which indicates that the concern of possible
oversales raised by hidden city ticketing might be subtle.
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Figure 12: Percentage of passengers denied boarding by the U.S. air carriers, 1990 to 2019.
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1.8 Conclusion
To conclude, this paper aims at analyzing the possible cause and impact of hidden city
ticketing. To achieve this goal, I have constructed a structural model, collected innovative
data, applied global optimization algorithm to solve the MLE, and conducted counterfactual
analysis. I find that hidden city ticketing occurs only when airline companies are applying
a hub-and-spoke network structure. And airlines apply hub-and-spoke network rather than
fully-connected network in order to reduce their operation costs. When airlines are not aware
of hidden city ticketing, hence do not alter their choices of prices and network structures in
the short run, we can derive from the theoretical model that, 1) hidden city ticketing does
not necessarily decrease airline’s expected profits, since the lower price also attracts more
passengers to take the flight; 2) consumers are always better off when hidden city ticketing
is allowed; 3) total social welfare always increase when hidden city ticketing is allowed.
During a longer horizon, firms would actively react to the conduct of hidden city tick-
eting and freely change their optimal choices of network structures and airfares. Under this
circumstances, based on the counterfactual analysis I have conducted, I find that 1) to maxi-
mize expected profits, fully-connected network is always better than hub-and-spoke network
for some routes (66.29%), while hub-and-spoke network outperforms fully-connected network
for some other routes (19.67%), regardless of the proportion of informed passengers; 2) for
the rest (14.03%) of the cases, airlines’ expected profits are larger under hub-and-spoke net-
work when there are less informed passengers, while fully-connected network becomes more
profitable when more and more passengers starting to exploit hidden city opportunities; 3)
airlines have the incentive to switch from hub-and-spoke network to fully-connected network
for half of the routes when there are approximately 10% of informed passengers, and for 75%
of the routes when informed passengers increase to around 19%; 4) if airlines change their
network choices because of hidden city ticketing, firms are suffering from revenue loss, while
consumers are not always better off (28.78% of the cases consumer surplus will decrease),
and total social welfare is not always larger neither (30.83% of the cases total surplus will
decrease). Therefore, enacting a simple regulation for prohibiting or permitting the conduct
of hidden city ticketing would be difficult, because welfare outcome varies route by route.
41
2.0 Maximum Likelihood Optimization via Parallel Estimating Gradient
Ascent
Global optimization without access to gradient information is a central task to many
econometric applications as the tool to obtain maximum likelihood estimators for very com-
plicated likelihood functions. The estimating gradient descent framework is particularly
popular, which uses local functional evaluation to build gradient estimates and perform gra-
dient descent from multiple initial points. In this work, we study the problem of coordination
between the multiple ”threads” of estimating gradient descent in order to pause or terminate
unpromising threads early. The high-level idea is to make predictions, either conservative
or aggressive, on the potential progress of each estimating gradient descent threads and to
compare them with the progress on other threads. We also test our proposed methodology
on both synthetic data and real airline pricing data, and compare with competitive methods
including the genetic algorithm and the pattern search algorithm. The numerical results
show the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed approach.
2.1 Introduction
Maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation is the workhorse for a wide range of inferring tasks
of econometric modeling. Mathematically, given model p(x; θ) with unknown parameter of








log p(xi; θ). (1)





The optimization question of Eq. (1) is then equivalent to maxθ∈Θ F (θ).
The primary focus of this paper is on the computation of approximate solutions of the
ML estimates (1) under challenging scenarios when the underlying model p(·; θ) is very
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complicated and has several undesirable properties. Some important challenges include but
are not limited to:
1. Non-concavity and non-unimodality of log-likelihood: the log-likelihood function
log p(xi; ·) might not be concave or even uni-modal with respect to the unknown parame-
ter θ, making “local search” type methods such as mountain-climbing or gradient ascent
difficult to find global optima of Eq. (1). Instead, it is very likely that these methods
would stuck in local minima or saddle points;
2. Inaccessible first-order information: many optimization methods, such as gradient
ascent or Newton’s method, requires access to first-order or even second-order derivatives
∇θ log p(xi; θ),∇2θ log p(xi; θ). Unfortunately, for many complicated econometric models,
even if such derivatives exist, they still cannot be easily computed in closed forms. This
prevents straightforward adoptions of famous continuous optimization algorithms to solve
Eq. (1);
3. Noisy zeroth-order evaluation: in some scenarios, even the log-likelihood function
log p(xi; θ) itself cannot be evaluated or computed without error, given data xi and a
hypothetical parameter θ. For example, in econometric models involving game theoret-
ical process with unknown parameters, the computation of log p(xi; θ) requires multiple
Monte-Carlo samples and cannot achieve arbitrary levels of accuracy;
4. Curse of dimensionality for multiple parameters: while nonparametric estimation
of the log-likelihood function naturally leads to an approximate optimization algorithm
for Eq. (1), such an approach suffers from the curse of dimensionality when there are more
than one parameters (i.e., d > 1). Even when d is moderately large (e.g., d ∈ [5, 10]),
estimating the entire log-likelihood function could already lead to unacceptable level of
computations.
In this paper, we propose an algorithm framework which we call “parallel estimating
gradient ascent”. Our algorithm has the following properties:
(a) Parallelism: the algorithm runs in parallel several computing threads simultaneously,
with vastly different initial points. This partially avoids the problem of being stuck in
local optima/saddle points, as the different computing threads could well lead/converge
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to different local minima;
(b) Gradient estimation: our method estimates the first-order derivative of the log-
likelihood function only with access to noisy evaluation of log p(xi; θ), making the pro-
posed method applicable to a wide range of econometric models;
(c) Coordination of computing threads: instead of running all parallel computing
threads with the same pace, we design “selection rules” and “stopping rules” to carefully
coordinate the different computing threads, so that promising computing threads are
devoted with more computing resource and unpromising threads are terminated early
without wasting more computing time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Sec. 2.2 we give accounts to related
works. The description of our proposed algorithm, as well as its several components and
convergence guarantees, are given in Sec. 2.3.
2.2 Related Works
The idea of using iterative methods to solve stochastic optimization questions without
first-order information is a well-studied topic in the literature of mathematical optimization,
machine learning and computational statistics. Estimating gradient descent/ascent origi-
nates from the works of [49, 16], which was later studied and explored in [62, 37, 13, 1, 73].
Our proposed approach also resembles “zeroth-order trust region” algorithms, studied in the
works of [10, 15, 77, 66, 32, 31]. The majority of this line of work assumes the objective
function to be optimized is convex (or concave, for maximization problems). An exception
is the work of [40], which considered non-convex objectives and studied how fast iterative
methods converge to stationary points of the said objectives.
Apart from iterative or estimating gradient type methods, many other heuristic algo-
rithms are also well-known for such global optimization questions considered in this paper.
Examples include the genetic algorithm [51, 85], simulated annealing [82], pattern search
[80, 53], as well as modern approaches such as Bayesian optimization [76] and hierarchical
optimistic optimization [25, 26].
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The idea of running several computing threads coordinating them appropriately has also
been explored in [2] in which bandit optimization problems are solved by running multiple
candidate algorithms in parallel, and in [59] to solve multi-armed bandit problems subject
to an unknown amount of adversarial corruption.
2.3 Algorithm Description
The pseudo-code description of the proposed algorithm framework is given in Algorithm
1. The algorithm consists of three major components: ThreadCoordination, Gradi-
entEstimation and ThreadStopping, which we describe in further details below and
in subsequent sections:
- ThreadCoordination: this component aims at the selection (at iteration t) of an
active thread j ∈ At, where At is the subset of all active threads at time t (see also
the description of ThreadStopping for the interpretation and construction of active
subsets). While the uniform distribution U(At) is the most widely used (which spreads
the computing resources evenly among all remaining active threads), other distributions
could be developed that favor more “promising” threads. Further details and discussion
are given in Sec. 2.3.1.
- GradientEstimation: this component aims at the (approximate) computation of
the first-order derivative ∇θF (θ) using only noisy evaluations of F (θ + δ), where δ ∈
Rd is a small d-dimensional perturbation vector. The computation is enabled by first-
order Taylor expansions of the objective function F centered at θ. Further details and
discussion are given in Sec. 2.3.2.
- ThreadStopping: this component identifies unpromising threads which are not pos-
sible to lead to or converge to good solutions. Such unpromising threads are identified
through comparison with the results from other threads, and are subsequently removed
from consideration in future iterations. The subset At is defined as the set consisting of
all active threads at iteration t, which forms the support of the thread distribution used
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0 , · · · , θ̂
(J)
0 be the initial parameter estimates of J computing threads; initialize
also J = {1, 2, · · · , J} as the set of active threads;
2: for τ = 0, 1, 2, · · · do
3: Select jτ ∈ J using the ThreadCoordination component;
4: Compute gτ = ∇̂θF (θ̂(jτ )τ ) using the GradientEstimation component;




τ − ητ∇̂θF (θ̂(jτ )τ )), where
ητ is a certain step size and PG(·) = arg minθ∈Θ ‖ · −θ‖2;
6: Eliminate threads in J using the ThreadStopping component;
7: end for
in the ThreadCoordination component. Further details and discussion are given in
Sec. 2.3.3.
2.3.1 The ThreadCoordination Component
The ThreadCoordination component, as suggested by its name, determines (poten-
tially randomly) at each time stamp t the particular computing thread j to be pursued for
the next iteration.
For clarity, we assume the algorithm is currently at time t (i.e., a total number of t
observations have already been collected), and thread j ∈ J is at parameter estimate θ̂(j)t .
We also use Tj,t(∆t) to denote the time stamps for the previous ∆t times thread j is selected,
up to time stamp t. We shall also assume that t is not too small. (When t is very small,
meaning that the optimization algorithm just starts, there is very little information regarding
the performance of each computing threads and hence the threads to pursue should be
selected uniformly at random from all J threads.) We use the following three aspects to
decide on which computing thread is to be pursued next:
1. Current performance: the current performance of each computing thread is of the ut-
most importance, since a thread that already performs well (i.e., attaining parameter
estimates with good objective values) is likely to further push the performance of the
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entire algorithm/system. For a particular thread j, its current performance can be esti-
mated as the average objective values over the last ∆t time stamps at which thread j is







2. Estimated progress : a thread that can progress fast (i.e., rapidly increasing the objective
value of the parameter estimates) should be pursued more frequently since they will
likely deliver fast progress for the overall algorithm/system performance as well. The
estimated progress of thread j can be obtained by comparing the its performance for the












3. Volatility : the “volatility” of a thread measures how stable/volatile of the quality of the
parameter estimates obtained by the thread. It can be estimated by the sample standard
deviation of the performance for the pervious ∆t time stamps during which thread j is








τ )− CP(j, t))2.
Once the statistics CP(j, t),EP(j, t),V(j, t) are computed for each thread j, an aggregated
statistic A(j, t) is calculated as
A(j, t) = κCPCP(j, t) + κEPEP(j, t) + κVV(j, t),
where κCP, κEP, κV ≥ 0 are pre-determined weight parameters that carefully balance the
three aspects we discussed above. The larger the value of A(j, t) is, the more promising the
thread j is deemed by our algorithm at time t. The thread selection/coordination rule is
then designed as




which selects computing thread j at random with probability positively correlated with its
score A(j, t).
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Algorithm 2 The GradientEstimation component/procedure.
1: Input: solution point θ ∈ Rd, probing radius δ > 0, number of probing points m ∈ N;
2: Output: ∇̂θF (θ) ∈ Rd, an estimate of ∇θF (θ).
3: Sample u1, · · · , um uniformly at random from the unit sphere {u ∈ Rd : ‖u‖2 = 1};
4: For each probing vector ui, i ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,m}, collect noisy function evaluation yj, y′j at
θ and θ + δui, respectively such that E[yj|θ, xj] = F (θ) and E[y′j|θ, xj] = F (θ + δuj);
5: Find ∇̂θF (θ) as the least-squares estimation










2.3.2 The GradientEstimation Component
The Gradient Estimation component aims at the approximate computation of the
first-order derivative ∇θF (θ) = 1N
∑N
i=1∇θ log p(xi; θ). A pseudo-code description of Gra-
dientEstimation is given in Algorithm 2.
As motivated in the introduction, such first-order derivatives ∇θF (θ) cannot be directly
computed in closed forms. Instead, given a hypothetical parameter θ′ (possibly different
from θ at which the derivative ∇θF (θ) is sought), one can compute a noisy evaluation
of F (θ′) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 log p(xi; θ
′). With many such noisy evaluations at different “probing”
positions θ′, a local linear model can be constructed via first-order Taylor expansions and
least-squares estimators are employed to find an estimator of ∇θF (θ).
The following lemma gives an upper bound on the estimation error of ∇̂θF (θ) under
the assumption that the gradients of the log-likelihood to be estimated, ∇F (·), is Lipschitz
continuous.
Lemma 1. Suppose ∇θF (·) is L-Lipschitz continuous, meaning that ‖∇θF (θ)−∇θF (θ′)‖2 ≤
L‖θ − θ′‖2 for all θ, θ′. Suppose also that Var(yj),Var(y′j) ≤ σ2 for some σ > 0, and
m ≥ 8d ln(d/δ) for some δ ∈ (0, 1/2). Then with probability at least 1 − δ, the estimation
error ∇̂θF (θ)−∇θF (θ) can be decomposed as
∇̂θF (θ)−∇θF (θ) = β + ζ,
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where ‖β‖2 ≤ Lδ almost surely and ζ ∈ Rd is a random vector satisfying E[ζ|θ] = 0 and
E[ζ>ζ|θ] ≤ 4d2/(mδ2).
Proof. Proof of Lemma 1. For notational simplicity denote yj = F (θ) + εj and y
′
j =
F (θ + δuj) + ε
′
j where E[εj|θ, uj] = E[ε′j|θ, uj] = 0 and Var[εj|θ, uj],Var[ε′j|θ, uj] ≤ σ2. By
the mean-value theorem, there exists ũj = λδuj for some λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
y′j − yj = F (θ + δuj)− F (θ) + (εj − ε′j) = 〈∇θF (θ + ũj), δuj〉+ (ε′j − εj)
= δ〈∇θF (θ), uj〉+ δ〈∇θF (θ + ũj)−∇θF (θ), uj〉+ (ε′j − εj).
Dividing both sides of the above equality by δ, we obtain
y′j − yj
δ
= 〈∇θF (θ), uj〉+ 〈∇θF (θ + ũj)−∇θF (θ), uj〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=bj
+ δ−1(ε′j − εj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=sj
. (2)
Next, define X = (u1;u2; · · · , um) ∈ Rm×d as an m × d matrix with each row corre-
sponding to a probing vector uj; z, b, s ∈ Rn as n-dimensional vectors with zj = (y′j − yj)/δ,
bj = 〈∇θF (θ + ũj)−∇θF (θ), uj〉, sj = (ε′j − εj)/δ for j = 1, 2, · · · , n. The estimate ∇̂θF (θ)
can then be written as ∇̂θF (θ) = (X>X)−1(X>z). In addition, z = X∇θF (θ)+ b+s thanks
to Eq. (2). Subsequently,
∇̂θF (θ)−∇θF (θ) = (X>X)−1X>(b+ s) = (X>X)−1X>b+ (X>X)−1X>s. (3)
Define β := (X>X)−1X>b. By Lemma 5, we know that ‖(X>X)−1‖op ≤ 2d/m with
probability 1− δ. Therefore,









m× ‖b‖∞ ≤ 2d‖b‖∞,
with probability 1− δ, where ‖b‖∞ = maxj |bj|. Because ∇θF (θ) is L-Lipschitz continuous,
|bj| can be upper bounded by
|bj| =
∣∣〈∇θF (θ + ũj)−∇θF (θ), uj〉∣∣ ≤ ‖∇θF (θ + ũj)−∇θF (θ)‖2 × ‖uj‖2
≤ L× ‖ũj‖2 × ‖uj‖2 ≤ Lδ,
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where the last inequality holds because ‖ũj‖2 = λδ‖uj‖2 ≤ δ since ‖uj‖2 = 1 and 0 < λ < 1.
Subsequently, we have with probability 1 that
‖β‖2 = ‖(X>X)−1X>b‖2 ≤ 2Ldδ. (4)
We next establish a co-variance upper bound on ζ = (X>X)−1X>s. It should be noted
that each sj = (εj − ε′j)/δ is a centered, independent random variable with variance upper
bounded by E[s2j |θ] ≤ 2/δ2. Subsequently, we have














Combining Eqs. (4,5) we complete the proof of Lemma 1.
2.3.3 The ThreadStopping Component
In the ThreadStopping component, we discuss rules for stopping a computing thread
j if it is deemed to be not promising, either unable or too time-expensive to converge to a
good-quality parameter estimate. While the proposed rules are heuristics in nature, we prove
under certain local concavity assumptions that these proposed stopping rules are conservative
in the sense that, with high probability, they will not remove a promising computing thread
by mistake.
We describe the two major stopping rules considered in the ThreadStopping compo-
nent, which can be categorized at a higher level as “first-order” and “second-order” rules.
2.3.3.1 First-order stopping rule Suppose thread j is currently at a parameter es-
timate θj, with gradient estimate ∇̂F (θ(j)τ ) ≈ ∇F (θ(j)τ ). Suppose also that an estimate
F̂ (θ
(j)
τ ) ≈ F (θ(j)τ ) is obtained by simply averaging all observations of yj in Algorithm 2. The
thread j should be terminated, then, if there exists another thread j′ 6= j such that
Stopping rule 1: F̂ (θ(j)τ ) +D × ‖∇̂F (θ(j)τ )‖2 ≤ F̂ (θ(j
′)
τ ).
Here, D > 0 is a tuning parameter for the stopping rule and also the optimization algorithm,
with larger D values indicating more aggressive (and hence less “safe”) stopping rule for
computing threads.
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Intuitively, the stopping rule obtains an “over-estimate” of the likelihood function F on
the solution thread j can potentially converge to, on the left-hand side of the stopping rule.
The intuition is that if F̂ (θ
(j)
τ ) is already small, it means that the function will change very
slowly in a neighborhood of θ
(j)
τ and therefore the estimating gradient ascent procedure is
unlikely to advance/improve the likelihood objective significantly in thread j.
Below we state a local concavity condition and shows that, with the condition held and
the estimates F̂ , ∇̂F being accurate, the proposed stopping rule is “safe” in the sense that it
will only remove computing threads impossible to obtain better parameter estimates. This
is further accomplished by showing that, F̂ (θ
(j)
τ ) + D × ‖∇̂F (θ(j)τ )‖2, under the considered
circumstances, is an upper bound on how large F (θ∗j ) could potentially be.
Condition 1 (Local concavity). For every computing thread j let θ∗j be the parameter the




′‖2 ≤ D, such that F is concave in Uj, meaning that
F (λx+ (1− λ)x′) ≥ λF (x) + (1− λ)F (x′), ∀x, x′ ∈ Uj, λ ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 2. Suppose F is twice differentiable, condition 1 holds and θ
(j)
τ ∈ Uj. Then F (θ∗j ) ≤
F (θ
(j)
τ ) +D‖∇F (θ(j)τ )‖2.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 2. Because F is twice differentiable and locally concave on Uj, we
know that ∇2F (θ)  0 for all θ ∈ Uj. Using second-order Taylor expansion of F (θ∗j ) at θ
(j)
τ
with Lagrangian remainders, it holds that
F (θ∗j ) = F (θ
(j)
τ ) + 〈∇F (θ(j)τ ), θ∗j − θ(j)τ 〉+
1
2
(θ∗j − θ(j)τ )>∇2F (θ̃)(θ∗j − θ̂(j)τ ),
where θ̃ = λθ∗j +(1−λ)θ
(j)
τ for some λ ∈ (0, 1), and θ̃ ∈ Uj since Uj is a convex domain. This
implies that ∇2F (θ̃)  0 and therefore (θ∗j − θ
(j)
τ )>∇2F (θ̃)(θ∗j − θ̂
(j)
τ ) ≤ 0. Subsequently,
F (θ∗j ) ≤ F (θ(j)τ ) + ‖∇F (θ(j)τ )‖2 × ‖θ∗j − θ(j)τ ‖2 ≤ F (θ(j)τ ) +D‖∇F (θ(j)τ )‖2,
where the first inequality is by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the second inequality
holds because ‖θ∗j − θ
(j)
τ ‖2 ≤ D.
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2.3.3.2 Second-order stopping rule The first stopping rule we developed in the pre-
vious section could be strengthened if the likelihood objective F has finer properties locally
around θ∗j . In this section we consider a second-order stopping rule, which stops a particular
thread j if there exists another thread j′ 6= j such that
Stopping rule 2: F̂ (θ(j)τ ) +
1
2α
× ‖∇̂F (θ(j)τ )‖22 ≤ F̂ (θ(j
′)
τ ).
Comparing the stopping rule 2 with stopping rule 1, the major difference is the squared
`2-norm of the estimated gradients of F at θ̂
(j)
τ . Inuitively speaking, this rule is more “aggres-
sive” than stopping rule 1, since when thread j approaches θ∗j it converges to, the gradients
would be close to zero and therefore ‖θ̂(j)τ ‖22 would be much smaller than ‖θ̂
(j)
τ ‖2.
Below we state a local strong-concavity condition, which is stronger than Condition 1
for stopping rule 1. We then show, in Lemma 3 below, that under the stronger condition
a “clearner” version of stopping rule 2 will not remove computing threads that are still
relevant.
Condition 2 (local strong-concavity). For every computing thread j let θ∗j be the parameter




′‖2 ≤ D, such that F is α-strongly concave in Uj, meaning that
∇2F (θ)  −αI, ∀θ ∈ Uj.
To see why Condition 2 is strong than Condition 1, recall that a twice-differentiable
function f is concave on U if ∇2f(x)  0 for all x ∈ U . This is weaker than Condition 2
with some α > 0.
Lemma 3. Suppose F is twice differentiable, condition 2 holds and θ
(j)
τ ∈ Uj. Then F (θ∗j ) ≤
F (θ
(j)




Proof. Proof of Lemma 3. Using second-order Taylor expansion of F (θ∗j ) at θ
(j)
τ with La-
grangian remainders, it holds that
F (θ∗j ) = F (θ
(j)
τ ) + 〈∇F (θ(j)τ ), θ∗j − θ(j)τ 〉+
1
2
(θ∗j − θ(j)τ )>∇2F (θ̃)(θ∗j − θ̂(j)τ ),
where θ̃ = λθ∗j + (1 − λ)θ
(j)
τ for some λ ∈ (0, 1), and θ̃ ∈ Uj since Uj is a convex domain.
Because ∇2F (θ̃)  −αI and |∇F (θ(j)τ ), θ∗j − θ
(j)
τ )| ≤ ‖∇F (θ(j)τ )‖2×‖θ∗j − θ
(j)
τ ‖2 thanks to the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we conclude that
F (θ∗j ) ≤ F (θ(j)τ ) + ‖∇F (θ(j)τ )‖2 × ‖θ∗j − θ(j)τ ‖2 −
α
2
‖θ∗j − θ(j)τ ‖22.
Completing the squares, we obtain
F (θ∗j )− F (θ(j)τ ) ≤ −
α
2
















Re-arranging the terms we have F (θ∗j )− F (θ
(j)




, which is to be demonstrated.
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2.4 Numerical Results on Synthetic Data
In this section we report numerical results of our proposed algorithm on the optimiza-
tion task of a synthetic function. We consider the problem of maximizing a 5-dimensional
non-concave function with multiple local maxima and saddle points. To construct such a
function, we use the probability-density function of a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM). More














with µk = ek ∈ R5 being the coordinate basis functions, σk = 1.0 for k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and σk =
0.5 for k = 0.5. The construction of the objective function f ensures that it has at least five
local minima with similar values, with the local minima tilting towards the last component
k = 5 being comparably higher due to its smaller variance. More specifically, via accurate
calculation, the global maxima of f(·) appears at x∗ = [0.0511, 0.0511, 0.0511, 0.0511, 0.7957],
very close to the center of the last Gaussian component, with an objective value of f(x∗) =
1.4572. Hence, if an (estimating) gradient descent algorithm is initialized near the first
for components it will be attracted to the first four local maxima first before escaping and
turning towards the final global maxima near the last component.
In Figure 13 we report the convergence of our proposed algorithm with five threads,
initialized to solutions close to each of the component centers µk defined in the objective
function. Both algorithms are run for a total of T = 100 gradient evaluations (total number
of time periods across all 5 threads), with each gradient evaluation taking m = 20 random
samples with δ = 0.1 probing radius. In the left panel of Figure 13, both the thread
coordination and thread stopping components are disabled (meaning that each time we
select a thread uniformly at random, and no thread is terminated early); in the right panel of
Figure 13, the thread coordination (thread sampling) component is activated with parameters
κCP = κEP = κV = 1 with history window ∆t = 100, and the thread stopping component
is activated with rule F̂ (θ
(j)
τ ) + 0.5‖θ(j)τ ‖2 ≤ F̂ (θ(j
′)
τ ). In both plots of Figure 13, we also
report in the dashed blue curve the objective function values of a hypothetical single-thread
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Figure 13: Convergence of our proposed algorithm with five threads. Details of the figures
and the algorithms being implemented are given in the main text. Note that the most
promising thread #5 converges to the optimal objective f ∗ = 1.4572 rather quickly even
with few number of function evaluations.
estimating gradient descent method, initialized at a point close to a sub-optimal component
center µk, k < 5.
From Figure 13, it is clear that our proposed algorithm with multiple threads (more
precisely 5 threads in this experiment) outperform its single-thread version significantly,
with the same number of function value/gradient evaluations (T = 100). Furthermore, the
right panel of Figure 13 shows that our thread coordination and thread stopping components
could quickly identify sub-optimal threads (those marked with red, yellow, black and magenta
curves) and stop them, while the same multi-thread optimization algorithm without thread
coordination or stopping is forced to almost evenly distribute the computation among the
five threads, wasting computation on unpromising threads and thereby slowing the overall
progress of the algorithm.
We also report the global (overall) convergence of the proposed algorithms in Figure 14.
For the single-thread curve (the dashed black curve) Figure 14 coincides with Figure 13.
For the other two curves corresponding to five threads, we report the best objective value
the algorithm attains after a total of t = 1, 2, · · · , 100 gradient/function value evaluations
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Figure 14: Global (overall) convergence of the proposed algorithm for single-thread,
five-thread without coordination/stopping and five-thread with coordination and stopping.
Further details are given in the main text.
are made. This gives the reader a more intuitive picture of the efficiency of the proposed
optimization algorithms. As we can see, the algorithm with both thread coordination and
thread stopping components activated (the solid blue curve) converges to higher objective
values much faster than the same algorithm with the same number of threads, but with
neither thread coordination nor thread stopping rules (the solid red curve). This is because
with thread coordination (sampling the more promising threads more frequently) and thread
stopping (terminating sub-optimal threads early to not waste more computation time on
these threads), the algorithm allows more samples/computation to be spent on the promising
thread so that the convergence speed of the algorithm is much faster.
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2.5 Numerical Results on Airline Pricing Data
In this section, we apply our proposed optimization method to a real-world airline pricing
dataset and compare its performance with benchmark heuristics optimization algorithms,
including the genetic algorithm and the pattern search algorithm. Our proposed algorithm
is implemented in C++, while both benchmark methods are implemented in Matlab.
2.5.1 Background: Hidden City Ticketing
Modern airlines operator primarily two types of flight networks: the hub-and-spoke net-
work, which designated a handful of airports as hubs and route most of the flights from all
airports to major hubs; and the fully-connected network, which operates direct flight in a
point-to-point manner. The hub-and-spoke network is adopted by major airlines such as the
United airlines and the Delta airlines, while the fully-connected approach is mostly used by
smaller, low-cost carriers such as Southwest and JetBlue.
In hub-and-spoke network, many flights between non-hub airports are carried out using
connecting flights. For example, the flight from Pittsburgh to Boston could be direct/non-
stop, but most likely it needs connection at a New York airport. Naturally, connecting flights
are priced (sometimes significantly) lower compared to direct flights due to the additional
connection and extended travel time. In some extreme cases, the price of the indirect flight
(e.g., Pittsburgh to Boston connecting via New York) might be even lower than the first-leg
of the flight (Pittsburgh to New York non-stop). This creates the possibility of hidden-city
ticketing, a practice that could significantly reduce the revenue/profits of the airlines.
More specifically, consider a traveller who wishes to travel from airport A to airport B.
The practice of hidden-city ticketing is defined as the same traveller purchasing a ticket from
airport A to airport C, connecting at airport B. The traveller would then proceed with only
the first leg of her purchased ticket, essentially traveling from A to B on a non-stop flight.
Clearly, such hidden-ticketing behavior is only practiced if the traveller knows about the
practice, and furthermore the price of a flight ticket from A to C connecting at B is strictly
lower than the price of a non-stop ticket directly from A to B.
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Figure 15: Illustration of fully-connected (FC) and hub-and-spoke (HS) structures among
three airports.
2.5.2 Model Formulation and Maximum Likelihood Estimation
We collected commercial flights operated among the 133 busiest commercial service air-
ports in the United States (identified by the FAA) with 96.34% of total passenger enplane-
ments, 16,142 routes and 2,822,086 itineries.
For every three distinct airport tuples (A,B,C), with flights connecting (A,B) and
(A,C), the flight network can be categorized as either fully-connected (FC), if there are
non-stop flights between (A,C), or hub-and-spoke (HS) if there are no direct flights between
A and C. Figure 15 gives a graphical illustration of the FC and/or HS network structures
among the airports A,B and C. We use dAB, dBC , dAC to denote the distances between
pairs of airports, and pAB, pBC , pAC for ticket prices of direct flights among the airports.
Additionally, we use pABC for the ticket price of the indirect flight from A to C connecting
at B.
We make the following assumptions on the supply side (the airlines):
1. There is only one airline serving the three cities, thus the firm charges monopoly airfares;
2. Aircrafts are assumed to have an unlimited capacity, thus there is one flight on each
route. C2 denote the airline’s cost per mile on any route j;
3. Direct flight has a quality of qh per mile and indirect flight has a quality of ql per mile,
with 0 < ql < qh < 1.
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Figure 16: The Stackelberg game description of the airlines’ network choices and travelers’
riding behaviors.
We also assume the following on the demand side (the travelers):
1. Each individual i has a time preference parameter of λi, obtaining utility C1e
λiqd − p
from consuming a good of quality q, and 0 if he/she does not fly;
2. On each route j, the distribution of consumers’ time preferences λij ∼ N (θj, σ21);
3. For passengers flying from A to B, the fraction of passengers being aware of hidden city
opportunity is δ and the fraction of uninformed passengers is 1− δ;
4. When hidden city opportunity exists (i.e., pAB > pABC), informed passengers will pay
pABC instead, while uninformed passengers will still pay pAB;
5. Amount of passengers on each route j are normalized to 1.
Based on the above assumptions, we use a Stackelberg game to characterize the airlines’
network choices and the travelers’ riding behaviors, as shown in Figure 16.
We next formulate the maximum likelihood estimation question that we aim to solve.
The problem is centered on the parameter of interest δ, representing the portion of travelers
who are aware and would be willing to exploit the benefits of hidden city ticketing. Other
nuisance parameters also needed to be estimated include C1 (the travelers’ average utility),
C2 (the airlines’ average cost), σ1 (standard deviation of λij), σ2 (standard deviation of
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θj ∼ N (µj, σ22)), qh and ql (utility multipliers for different types of travelers). Mathematically,
we use
ζ = (δ, C1, C2, σ1, σ2, qh, ql) ∈ R7
to denote a vector of parameter values.
For each airports tuple (Ai, Bi, Ci) in the collected data such that there are at least one
flights between (Ai, Bi) and (Bi, Ci), respectively, we use
yi ∈ {0, 1}
to denote the airline’s actual choice of FC or HS structures (i.e., yi = 1 if there are di-
rect flights between (Ai, Ci) and yi = 0 otherwise). The accessible data for airport tuple
(Ai, Bi, Ci) are represented as
xi = (pAB, pBC , pAC , pABC , dAB, dBC , dAC , µB, µC) ∈ R9,
where pAB, pBC , pAC , pABC are flight ticket prices, dAB, dBC , dAC are distances between air-
ports, and µB, µC are expected values of θB, θC which are obtained via analyzing the typical
flows of flights/passengers for each of the 133 airports in the data set.
With θB ∼ N (µB, σ22) and θC ∼ N (µC , σ22) realized, the expected profit for the airline








}dt be the cumulative
density function (CDF) of N (µ, σ2). First, in the case of Fully-Connected (FC) network, the
expected profit is














In the case of Hub-and-Spoke (HS) network, there are two cases. The first case is pAB < pABC ,




















Note that, because the direct flight between A and C is no longer operated in a hub-and-spoke
network, and therefore RlABC is a pure profiting term.
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Finally, in the case of pAB ≥ pABC , there is potential profit loss due to hidden-city
ticketing. The airline’s profit is
ΠHS = (1− δ)ΠAB + ΠBC +RlABC + δRhABC














where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the parameter of interest corresponding to the portion of travelers engaged
in the hidden-city ticketing practice.
Given tuple xi and the observed airline’s network choice yi ∈ {0, 1}, the log-likelihood of
yi conditioned on xi and parameter ζ can be written as


















logP (yi|xi; θ), (7)
where N is the total number of airport tuples (A,B,C) available in the data collected.
2.5.3 Results
Before presenting the computational results, we first mention some important imple-
mentation details. First, because the distances dXY are measure in miles and could vary
drastically, we adopt a re-normalization transform dXY 7→
√
dXY to alleviate the scales of
the distances. We also note that the log-likelihood in Eq. (6) cannot be evaluated directly be-




terms do not admit easy closed-form expression. Instead, we
use Monte-Carlo sampling with MMC samples to approximately compute the log-likelihood.
Finally, because the collected data consist of many airport tuples (i.e., N > 105), we use a
“mini-batch” approach when evaluating the objective function in Eq. (7). More specifically,
we randomly sample MMB  N airport tuples and use the average log-likelihood on the ran-
domly sampled mini-batch data to approximate the log-likelihood of the objective function
on the entire data set.
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Table 5: Results for our proposed algorithm on the airline pricing data, with
D = 1/2α ∈ {1.0, 0.5, 0.3}. A × means that the particular thread is not active at the end
of the optimization.
D = 1/2α log. likeli. δ C1 C2 σ1 σ2 qh ql running time (s)
Thread #1 1.0 -0.69 0.01 6.33 0.76 0.69 0.82 0.53 0.10 108.9
0.5 -0.69 0.02 6.34 0.78 0.72 0.85 0.52 0.10 107.7
0.3 -0.68 0.02 6.33 0.78 0.72 0.87 0.52 0.10 108.3
Thread #2 1.0 -0.73 0.49 11.8 0.95 0.35 0.86 0.54 0.12 108.9
0.5 -0.71 0.50 11.8 0.94 0.35 0.93 0.52 0.12 107.7
0.3 × × × × × × × × ×
Thread #3 1.0 -0.71 0.06 10.3 0.74 0.37 0.96 0.49 0.10 108.9
0.5 -0.70 0.07 10.3 0.74 0.39 0.99 0.47 0.11 107.7
0.3 -0.69 0.07 10.3 0.76 0.43 1.0 0.47 0.11 108.3
Thread #4 1.0 -0.68 0.50 10.9 0.95 0.72 0.83 0.34 0.10 108.9
0.5 -0.69 0.49 10.9 0.96 0.72 0.82 0.33 0.12 107.7
0.3 -0.67 0.48 10.9 0.91 0.73 0.86 0.33 0.12 108.3
Thread #5 1.0 -0.71 0.43 12.0 0.96 0.59 0.77 0.36 0.11 108.9
0.5 × × × × × × × × ×
0.3 × × × × × × × × ×
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Table 6: Results for the genetic algorithm (ga) and the pattern search algorithm (ps).
Each algorithm terminates only when the designated time limit is reached. MMB equals to
MMC are the mini-batch sizes and the number of Monte-Carlo samples, respectively.
MMB MMC log. likeli δ C1 C2 σ1 σ2 qh ql running time (s)
Genetic algorithm 200 200 -0.73 0.30 5.03 0.68 0.61 0.86 0.85 0.27 100
200 200 -0.75 0.28 5.36 0.73 0.58 0.78 0.82 0.28 300
500 500 -0.69 0.31 3.66 0.70 0.81 0.95 0.93 0.21 600
Pattern search 200 200 -0.82 0.13 7.5 0.10 0.10 0.85 1.0 0.10 100
200 200 -1.01 0.0 8.0 0.10 0.10 0.60 1.0 0.10 300
500 500 -0.76 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.51 0.76 0.58 0.16 600
We also impose the following constraints on each of the parameters in ζ to be estimated:
δ ∈ (0, 1/2], C1 ∈ [1, 20], C2 ∈ [0.1, 1], σ1 ∈ [0.1, 1], σ2 ∈ [0.1, 1] and 0.1 ≤ ql ≤ qh ≤ 1.
These constraints are imposed to ensure the values of the unknown parameters are practically
feasible and reasonable.
We first present computational results for our proposed parallel stochastic gradient ascent
algorithm. Algorithmic parameters are set as κCP = κEP = κV = 1 for the ThreadCoor-
dination component, m = 20, δ = 0.05 for the GradientEstimation component, and
D = 1/2α ∈ {1.0, 0.5, 0.3} for the ThreadStopping component. The algorithm is run for
T = 200 iterations, 5 initial threads with random initializations, and with the log-likelihood
of the final solution of each active threads being reported in Tables ??.
As we can see from Table ??, at the end of the optimization there are 5 active threads
if D = 1/2α = 1.0, 4 active threads if D = 1/2α = 0.5 and 3 active threads if D =
1/2α = 0.3. This is intuitive because smaller D = 1/2α values indicate a more aggressive
thread elimination policy, thereby leading to fewer active threads. In the core three threads
(Threads #1, 3, 4) the log-likelihood is consistently below −0.7, indicating likely scenarios
in the real world. Our algorithm takes roughly 100 seconds to complete an optimization.
We next compare the results obtained by our proposed algorithm with two baseline
methods widely used in global optimization: the genetic algorithm and the pattern search
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algorithm. Both algorithms have been implemented in Matlab in standard packages, via the
ga and the patternsearch routine. The results for both algorithms are reported in Table
6, with their corresponding running times. Note that the running times are set prior to each
run, and the optimization algorithms simply terminate once the time budgets are reached.
Table 6 shows that, both the genetic algorithm and the pattern search algorithm take much
longer time (around or even more than 10 minutes) to converge to less optimal solutions
compared to the ones found by our proposed algorithm in 100 seconds. This demonstrates
the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed approach.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a general framework of optimizing functions with noisy function
evaluations. The proposed framework is based on running multiple threads of stochastic
estimating gradient ascent algorithms in parallel, and to carefully coordinate the different
computing threads. Theoretical analysis and justifications are given for the stopping rules
used in the proposed method, and numerical results on both synthetic data and a real airline
industry data set are provided to corroborate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed
methods.
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3.0 Does H-1B Visa Reforms Affect Whether US Natives Major in STEM
Fields?
This chapter exploits large changes in the H-1B visa program and examines the effect of
changes in H-1B admission levels on the likelihood that US natives major in STEM fields.
Compare to effect on labor market outcomes, the possible impact of H-1B visa reforms on
natives’ college major choices indicate effect over longer horizons. I find some evidence that
H-1B population adversely affect natives’ choices in STEM fields when they enter the college
and graduate from it. Female, male and White subgroups have been negatively affected, and
the native Asian subgroup suffer from the most dramatic crowd-out effect. Given that the
H-1B population share had been more than doubled during 1992 to 2017, the probability of
native Asian graduates majoring in STEM fields would be 2.56 percentage points larger, if
the H-1B population shares had remained at their 1992 levels and all else had remained the
same. Since foreign-born Asian account for a large proportion of H-1B visa holders, there
might be an interesting “Asian crowd out Asian” story.
3.1 Introduction
The number of college students major in STEM (science, technology, engineering and
mathematics) fields is commonly viewed as critical to the long-term technology advancement
and economic growth of United States. Nowadays, there has been concern that not enough
US natives are studying in STEM fields, and one possible reason is that they might be
crowded out by foreign-born students. According to the data released by 2009-17 American
Community Survey (ACS), the proportion of US natives major in STEM fields varied within
the range of 15% to 25% during year 1960 to 2017. It was relatively stable fluctuating around
20% in 1990s and 2000s, and kept increasing after 2010. But the percentage of foreign-born
students major in STEM fields has been always higher than that of native graduates, and it
showed a nearly 15% increase during 1960 to 2017. Theoretically, large amount of foreign-
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born students studying STEM majors might be a double-edged sword for native graduates.
Foreign-born students could possibly crowd out natives of STEM majors because they are
competing for limited education resources, or there might be positive spill-over effect instead
when natives are attracted and retained in those fields.
The relationship between natives’ college major choices and H-1B visa reforms might be
trivial at first glance. But according to the data released by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), large proportion of H-1B visa holders work in STEM related occupations.
Thus the H-1B visa program governs most admissions of foreign-born graduates with a
bachelor’s degree or above major in STEM fields for employment in United States. Therefore,
whether the large changes in this program will affect US natives’ major choices in STEM
fields or not becomes an interesting research question to explore.
Since it was created in year 1992, the controversy over H-1B visa program never stops.
Proponents emphasize that those high-skilled workers are important to the technology ad-
vancement of US economy, and if H-1B visa is contracted, “America is losing many very
skilled workers ... They are losing their dreams, and America is losing the value they bring”.
([86]). While the detractors keep worried about native US workers being displaced by foreign-
born workers, or furthermore, native US students being crowded out by foreign-born students
in especially STEM fields. Compare to the impact on natives’ labor market outcomes, pos-
sibility of affecting the major choices in STEM fields of native students might be even more
worthy of studying, because the effect could be on the US economy operation over longer
horizons.
To bring identification to the research question, following [48], I will exploit large changes
in the H-1B population over the 1992-2017 period. The H-1B population fluctuated sub-
stantially during this period because firstly, the national cap on new H-1B issuance varied
a lot from a lower bound of 65,000 new workers a year to a higher bound of 195,000. Sec-
ondly, the usage of cap and total H-1B issuance also varied a lot due to the change of policy
and economic condition. According to the summary statistics published by USCIS, large
proportion of H-1B specialty occupation workers are young (between the ages of 25 and 34),
well educated (with a bachelor’s degree or above), working in STEM-related occupations
and earn relatively high median salary.
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This study focuses on the relationship between natives’ college major choices and H-
1B visa reforms. More specifically, I am trying to measure the impact of changes in H-1B
population on the probability that US native students choose to major in STEM related fields
when they enter the college and graduate from it. I choose the undergraduate level education
because this is the key step for an individual to obtain a STEM degree and work in STEM
related occupations after graduation. The ACS is a large-scale survey conducted by the U.S.
Census Bureau every year and it has asked respondents with at least a bachelor’s degree
to report their college majors since 2009. Although there are previous literatures looking
at the outcomes of H-1B visa program, and literatures focusing on the possible factors that
affect students’ major choices, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper examining
the relationship between H-1B visa reforms and US natives’ college major choices in STEM
fields directly.
More specifically, this paper measures the possible impact of changes in H-1B admission
levels on the likelihood that US natives major in STEM fields over the 1992-2017 period.
To bring identification of this problem, I exploit the variation of H-1B population shares
across areas and over time. This is not easy due to data limitation. Exploiting the variation
of H-1B population across more narrowly defined labor markets is difficult with standard
data resources. Therefore, I have applied a innovative approach exploiting the micro-level
data in the first step of H-1B visa application. Another challenge is to identify the causal
relationship, which is also difficult because of the endogeneity of immigrants’ self location
choices. Hence I have applied an instrumental variable approach constructing an IV based
on the historic settlement pattern of foreign-born STEM workers. To better interpret the
results, I also take a further look at the impacts on different gender and race subgroups. This
is a reasonable approach because different subgroups vary from one to another. According to
the data, much less female students choose STEM majors compare to male students, while
much more Asian natives choose to major in STEM fields compare to other race groups.
Existing literatures also find some heterogeneity among different gender and race subgroups.
For example, [43] shows that the persistence in STEM majors is much lower for women
and minorities. [64] also find similar results, while [69] find the opposite. Analyzing the
results for different subgroups could reveal a more complete story and help shed light on
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policy implications. For all of my preferred specifications, I have included control variables
of lagged H-1B population, personal characteristics, and labor market conditions. State
and year fixed effects and state-specific linear trends are also included to make the causal
relationship more valid.
In this paper, I have found significant negative impacts of H-1B population shares on
natives majoring in STEM fields, both when they enter the college and graduate from it.
For students beginning their college education, a 10% increase in the H-1B population share
decreases the probability of native students choosing STEM majors by 0.032%, decreases the
likelihood of a male native student majoring in STEM related fields by 0.07%, and decreases
that of a White native student by 0.025%. Given that the H-1B population share had been
more than doubled from year 1992 to 2017, the probability of native students majoring
in STEM fields when they enter the college would be 0.74 percentage points larger, if the
H-1B population shares had remained at their 1992 levels and all else had remained the
same. Similarly, the likelihood of male native students choosing STEM majors would be
1.62 percentage points larger, and that of White native students would be 0.58 percentage
points larger. For students graduating from college, results indicate that a 10% increase
in the H-1B population share decreases the probability of native graduates choosing STEM
majors by 0.021%, decreases the likelihood of a female native graduate majoring in STEM
related fields by 0.014%, decreases that of a male native graduate by 0.032%, and decrease
that of a White native graduate by 0.02%. The native Asian subgroup suffer from the most
dramatic crowd-out effect. A 10% increase in the H-1B population share would decrease the
likelihood of an Asian native graduate majoring in STEM related fields by as large as 0.111%.
Again, given that the H-1B population share had been more than doubled, the probability
of native graduates majoring in STEM fields when they graduate would be 0.49 percentage
points larger, the likelihood of female native graduates choosing STEM majors would be
0.32 percentage points larger, that of male native graduates would be 0.74 percentage points
larger, and that of White native graduates would be 0.46 percentage points larger. For
the native Asian subgroups, the probability would have been as large as 2.56 percentage
points larger if the H-1B population shares had remained at their 1992 levels and all else
had remained the same. Since foreign-born Asian account for a large proportion of H-1B
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visa holders, there might be an interesting “Asian crowd out Asian” story here.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: The introduction of related works
is summarized in Section 3.2. The background information including the US college major
choices and the H-1B visa program, as well as the details of the dataset being used are ex-
plained in more details in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 respectively. Section 3.5 describes the
empirical framework in details, including the plain Probit regression model and the instru-
mental variable approach. Section 3.6 shows the results of both approaches and Section 3.7
concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
Previous literatures mainly focus on the labor market outcomes of H-1B visa program.
[55], [57], [50], and [70] provide some general information about H-1B visa program, H-1B
population estimates and characteristics of H-1B visa holders. The evidence of impact of
H-1Bs on labor market outcomes are mixed. Some papers find that the H-1B visa holders
adversely affect native workers’ employment opportunities, wages, etc. For example, [56]
raise some concern given trends in the postdoctoral labor market and for employers in ‘job
shops’ who undercut US workers with temporary workers. [61] criticize that the industry’s
motivation for hiring H-1Bs is primarily a desire for cheap, compliant labor, and show the
adverse impacts of the H-1B program on various segments of the American computer-related
labor force. [50] find some evidence of aggressive wage-cost cutting, including paying H-1B
recipients only the legally mandated 95 percent of the prevailing US wage, among some
H-1B employers. In contrast, some other papers show positive impacts of H-1B workers on
natives’ earnings, employment rate, etc. For example, [87] find some positive relationship
between LCAs (Labor Condition Applications, the first step towards H-1B visa application)
and earnings, earnings growth, and the unemployment rate in the IT sector at the state
level. [48] show that higher H-1B admissions increase immigrant science and engineering
(SE) employment and patenting by inventors with Indian and Chinese names in cities and
firms dependent upon the program relative to their peers. [44] find that immigrants who
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entered on a temporary work visa have a large advantage over natives in wages, patenting,
and publishing, and are more likely to start companies than similar natives. [65] show that
increases in STEM workers are associated with significant wage gains for college-educated
natives, and foreign STEM increased total factor productivity growth in US cities.
Besides the mixed evidence of impacts of H-1B workers on native workers’ labor mar-
ket outcomes, there are also a few studies paying attention to the H-1B visa program on
educational outcomes. For example, [47] find that restrictive immigration policy dispro-
portionately discourages high-ability international students from pursuing education in the
United States. And [4] show that the binding cap of H-1B visa raises international students’
likelihood of employment in academia, even outside of their field of study.
With respect to students’ college major choices, existing literatures have revealed different
factors that might contribute to this decision making process - in STEM or non-STEM fields
- and whether students tend to persist or change their majors during college, using both
reduced-form and structural model approaches. For example, [22] find that the number of
foreign PhD students in sciences majors shows a positive effect on undergraduate students
also choosing sciences majors. [7] show that academic background can fully account for
average differences in switching behavior between blacks and whites. [58] find that weaker,
non-minority students typically respond to greater competition in the sciences by shifting
their major choice. [63] find some evidence that immigration adversely affects whether US-
born women who graduated from college majored in a science or engineering field. [6] show
significant sorting into majors based on academic preparation, with science majors at each
campus having on average stronger credentials than their non-science counterparts. [9] find
that students with relatively greater non-STEM ability are more likely to switch out of
STEM. [5] estimate a dynamic model of the ability sorting across majors and conclude that
virtually all ability sorting is because of preferences for particular majors in college and
the workplace. [8] estimate a model of college major choice that incorporates subjective
expectations and assessments and show that both expected earnings and students’ abilities
in the different majors are important determinants of a student’s choice of a college major.
[3] develop a dynamic model of educational decision-making and figure out the important
role for heterogeneity in tastes for fields of study and the occupations they lead to.
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To summarize, there are previous literatures looking at the outcomes of H-1B visa pro-
gram, and literatures focusing on the possible factors that affect students’ major choices,
while to the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to exam the relationship between
H-1B visa reforms and US natives’ college major choices in STEM fields directly.
3.3 U.S. College Major Choices
My paper applied data on college majors from the 2009-17 ACS. The ACS is a large-
scale survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau every year. Since 2009, it started to ask
respondents with at least a bachelor’s degree to report their college major. To define STEM
majors, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made a STEM Designated Degree
Program list, which is a complete list of fields of study that DHS considers to be science,
technology, engineering or mathematics (STEM) fields of study for purposes of the 24-month
STEM optional practical training extension. According to the regulation, a STEM field of
study is a field of study “included in the Department of Education’s Classification of In-
structional Programs taxonomy within the two-digit series containing engineering, biological
sciences, mathematics, and physical sciences, or a related field. In general, related fields will
include fields involving research, innovation, or development of new technologies using engi-
neering, mathematics, computer science, or natural sciences (including physical, biological,
and agricultural sciences)”. Combine the STEM Designated Degree Program list with the
field of degree information provided by ACS, I have established a list of STEM majors in
appendices Table 13. Compare to the classification in [63], which includes only majors in
biology and life sciences, physical sciences, engineering, computer and information sciences,
and mathematics and statistics as STEM majors, my classification is broader and fits the
STEM optional practical training extension well, which is highly correlated with the H-1B
visa program. This broader classification has increased the percentage of STEM majors in
my raw data from 19.74% (according to the definition of STEM majors in [63]) to 22.64%.
Assume that the traditional college age is aged 18-22. Figure 17 shows the percentage
of US native college graduates who majored in STEM fields when they were age 22, the
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modal age when they graduated, during year 1960 to 2017, as well as that of foreign-born
students. The solid line indicates that the proportion of US natives majoring in STEM
fields varied within the range of 15% to 25% during the period. It declined in the 1960s
and rose in the 1970s. The increase in the 1970s and early 1980s might reflect the emphasis
on science and math during that time ([63]). A sharp decrease occurred in mid-1980s and
the ratio went back to around 20% until 2010. It seems that the Internet boom of the late
1990s did not have a significant impact on native students’ major choices in STEM fields.
The ratio kept increasing after year 2010. Due to the data collecting process, foreign-born
students being included in the analysis are those who were living in the United States when
the ACS was conducted. The dot line shows that a much higher percentage of foreign-born
students choosing to major in STEM related fields compared to native graduates, and the
ratio revealed a nearly 15% increase during this period. After the introduction of H-1B
visa program since early 1990s, the ratio kept growing when the program expanded and
decreased when the policy contracted in early 2000s. After that it began rebounding when
the macroeconomy started to recover from the crisis, and the H-1B population also kept
growing since then.
Figure 18 shows the percentage of US native college graduates majoring in STEM fields
by gender group. In general, the proportion of male and female STEM students share similar
trends during this time period. The proportion of male students choosing STEM majors is
much higher than that of female students, whereas female students showed a more stable
increasing trend compared to that of the male students. Figure 19 shows the percentage
of US native college graduates majoring in STEM fields by race group. I have divided the
native students into four different race groups: non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black,
Asian and Hispanic. The non-Hispanic other race is not shown. The solid line representing
the non-Hispanic white group is smooth with largest number of observations. Dot line for
non-Hispanic black group and dash line for Hispanic group show smaller percentages of native
students majoring in STEM fields, compared to that of the non-Hispanic white group. The
Asian group, represented by the dash dot line, indicates a much higher and more volatile
proportion of STEM students compared to all the other three groups.
In my empirical analysis, I will match the state-level data of H-1B population with
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Figure 17: The proportion of college graduates majoring in STEM by nativity.
individuals’ state of birth. State of birth is the only place of residence available in the ACS
besides the current place and place one year ago, and state of birth is also highly correlated
with the state of having college education in United States, compared to the other two
places. There are also other previous literatures using the state of birth to examine state-
level variables related to college education. ([29], [35], [21], [63]) An advantage of using state
of birth is to mitigate the endogeneity selection bias that might arise if the H-1B population
affects US native college students’ location choice of college attendance. According to the
data published by National Center for Education Statistics, the average ratio of all first-
time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduates in degree-granting postsecondary institutions
entering a college within their state of birth was as high as 81.80% in year 1992 (Utah has the
highest proportion of 94% and Connecticut has the lowest of 59%, with District of Columbia
being excluded) and 78.38% in year 2016 (Utah has the highest proportion of 90.85% and
Vermont has the lowest of 50.60%, with District of Columbia being excluded). Figure 20
shows the variation of proportion of in-state students across states when they entered the
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Figure 18: The proportion of U.S. native college graduates majoring in STEM by gender.
Figure 19: The proportion of U.S. native college graduates majoring in STEM by race.
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college in year 1992 and 2016, respectively. From the literature and the data, we should
be able to reasonably conclude that state of birth is a good indicator of the state where
US natives have their college education. Since not all of the students entering college in
their state of birth, my estimates are likely to underestimate the possible impact of H-1B
visa reform on US natives’ college major choices, and this underestimation would be slightly
different across states.
Figure 20: The variation of proportion of U.S. natives entering college within their state of
birth across states (year 1992 and 2016, District of Columbia excluded).
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3.4 H-1B Visa Program
The H-1B is a visa in the United States that allows U.S. employers to temporarily employ
foreign workers in specialty occupations. The regulations define a specialty occupation as
“requiring theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in
a field of human endeavor including but not limited to biotechnology, chemistry, computing,
architecture, engineering, statistics, physical sciences, medicine and health, and requiring
the attainment of a bachelor’s degree or its equivalent as a minimum” (U.S. Code Title 8,
Chapter 12, Subchapter II, Part II, Section 1184 - Admission of nonimmigrants).
Since year 2004, USCIS started to publish the Annual Report to Congress including
Report on H-1B Petitions and Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation Workers, both
of which provide some summary statistics of H-1B workers. In general, H-1B specialty
occupation workers are young (between the ages of 25 and 34) and well educated (with a
bachelor’s degree or above). More than 80% of those visa holders work in STEM related
occupations, such as occupations in computer sciences, engineering, mathematics, physical
sciences and life sciences. They also earn much higher median salary compared to the U.S.
average. For example, in year 2017, the median salary of beneficiaries of approved H-1B
petitions increased to $85,000, much higher than the nominal median income per capita of
$31,786 and the real median household income of $61,372 reported by the Census Bureau.
More details of the characteristics of H-1B workers are summarized in Table 7.
Because the H-1B visa is a necessity for a foreign-born graduate to work in United
States, any reform of it towards to or away from STEM students would reasonably affect
foreign-born students’ major choices in especially STEM fields, and therefore, might crowd
US natives out or have positive spillovers on them through attracting or retaining them in
those fields.
The H-1B visa program has been changing ever since it started. The Immigration Act of
1990 (implemented in 1992) created the H-1B visa for professional foreign nationals seeking
temporary employment in the United States. At the time of its creation, 65,000 H-1B visas
became available for new applicants each year. The cap was not reached until fiscal year
1997 and again in 1998. In October 1998, Congress enacted the American Competitiveness
76
Table 7: Characteristics of H-1B specialty occupation workers.
Year % age % bachelor’s % master’s % doctorate % computer- Median
25-34 degree degree degree related salary
occupations
2004 65.5 48.7 33.9 11.2 44.5 $53,000
2005 65.6 44.8 36.8 5.3 43.0 $55,000
2006 66.1 45.0 38.6 10.6 48.4 $60,000
2007 65.7 44.0 40.4 10.1 49.8 $60,000
2008 66.1 43.0 40.6 10.9 49.6 $60,000
2009 65.9 40.9 39.9 12.6 41.6 $64,000
2010 67.7 42.5 39.2 11.7 47.5 $68,000
2011 69.7 41.4 41.7 5.2 50.8 $70,000
2012 72.1 46.3 40.8 8.4 59.5 $70,000
2013 70.9 45.0 41.1 8.8 59.8 $72,000
2014 71.7 45.0 43.1 7.8 64.5 $75,000
2015 71.0 45.0 44.0 7.0 66.5 $79,000
2016 68.9 44.2 45.4 6.9 69.1 $82,000
2017 66.2 45.2 44.5 6.8 69.8 $85,000
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and Workforce Improvement Act (ACWIA), which temporarily raised the cap to 115,000 for
fiscal years 1999 and 2000. Limit were both reached. Congress responded to the increase in
demand for H-1B visas with the American Competitiveness in the 21st Century Act (AC21).
The act had two relevant effects. First, it reduced the number of H-1B visas that counted
toward the quota by exempting employees of universities, nonprofit research organizations,
and governmental research organizations. Second, it raised the cap to 195,000 for each
of year 2001, 2002, and 2003. Those limits were never reached. In year 2004, Bachelor’s
degree cap returned to 65,000 with added 20,000 visas for applicants with U.S. postgraduate
degrees. The H-1B cap has been binding every year since then. On April 2, 2008, the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security announced a 17-month extension to the OPT for students
in qualifying STEM fields. And the 17-month extension has been replaced by a longer 24-
month extension since May 10, 2016, which allows the foreign STEM students to work up
to 36 months under their student visa, and provides them as long as three years to obtain
an H-1B visa.
Figure 21 shows the annual H-1B visa issurance cap (dash line), the H-1B visa issuance
for initial employment (dot line), and the H-1B visa population estimate (solid line) during
the fiscal year 1992 to 2017. In FY 1999 the actual issuance exceeded the national cap
because of a computer malfunction announced by Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS). In recent years, the decoupling of the actual issuances and the numerical cap is due to
the policy change that employees working for specific institutions have been exempted from
the quota.
The solid line in Figure 21 represents an important estimation of H-1B population from
FY 1992 to 2017. In this paper, I use the population stock rather than the net issuances or
the cap as my primary explanatory variable. Because the change of H-1B population stock
reflects not only the change of H-1B inflow but also the outflow, it provides more complete
information when we want to see the possible impact of H-1B visa reforms on natives’ college
major choices. Estimating the H-1B visa population is not straightforward. Although the
initial H-1B visa issuance provides a reasonably good measurement of the inflow, the outflow
estimation needs to be modeled carefully. [55] provides one way to model the outflow of H-
1B pool using the information of transitions to permanent residency, emigration, and death.
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Figure 21: H-1B visa issuance and population estimates.
And [48] applies Lowell’s updated estimates in their 2010 paper. In this study, I will measure
the outflow in a more innovative and precise way. Following [33], I assume that the outflow
of H-1B pool results not only from people adjusting to lawful permanent resident (LPR)
status, emigration and death, but also from some measurement error because of H-1B one-
year extensions, possible duplicate petitions, and people changing for employers. Data of
adjustment to LPR status come from the yearbook of INS and DHS. Emigration estimations
come from [14] paper. I explore the CDC’s (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention)
online tool to compute an estimated H-1B mortality rate, as that of Asian and Pacific Islander
males between the ages of 25 and 34 by the year 2017. Information of changing employers
are from the USCIS yearbook. And according to [33], estimated rate of duplicate petitions
approved is around 1% and appoved H-1B one-year extensions estimated by DHS is 18.3%.
In Figure 21 we can see that the resulting change in H-1B visa population is large enough
to be economically important.
Beyond those nation-level broad statistics, research related to H-1B visa program has
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been largely restricted by the data limitation. In order to exploit the variation across more
narrowly defined labor markets, and control for the many contemporaneous national changes
occurring within the United States during the same period, I follow the methodology in [48]
and exploit the more micro trends using the data of Labor Condition Applications (LCAs)
published by U.S. Department of Labor. According to the regulation, for every H-1B petition
filed with the USCIS, a LCA must first be certified by the U.S. Department of Labor to ensure
that the wage offered to the non-immigrant worker meets or exceeds the “prevailing wage”
in the area of employment, so that U.S. workers’ wages or working conditions will not be
displaced or adversely affected by the foreign workers. A big advantage of LCA data is that
it provides much more detailed information of the potential H-1B visa holders, including
their work city, county (since 2015) and state since 2001. Although the LCA approvals do
not translate one for one into H-1B grants because of the national cap of the H-1B visa
issuances, it should be one of the (best) indicators available to shed light on the variation of
H-1B population across states.
Since the ACS data only provides state-level information of natives’ birthplace, in this
paper I will use state as the primary labor market to quantify the possible impact of changing
H-1B population on US natives’ college major choices in STEM related fields. In order to
estimate H-1Bs,t, I assume that the variation of H-1B population across states is proportional
to the portion of LCAs across states, i.e., H-1Bs,t can be estimated by the following formula,




Data of LCAs,t is available since year 2001, thus for year 1992 to 2000, I further assume that
the LCAs,t=1992−2000 is equal to the average of LCAs,t=2001−2017.
For every state, I compute the share of H-1B population with respect to state population
and rank them according to their “dependency” on H-1B population. Table 8 shows the top
10 and bottom 10 states in year 1992 and 2017 respectively. We can see that there is large
variation of H-1B population share across states, ranging from 0.01% (Montana) to 0.34%
(District of Columbia, or 0.24% of New Jersey if District of Columbia is excluded) in 1992
and 0.02% (Wyoming) to 0.57% (District of Columbia, or 0.47% of New Jersey if District
of Columbia is excluded) in 2017. The standard deviation was as high as 0.06% in 1992
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and raised to 0.13% in 2017. The change of H-1B population proportions from 1992 to 2017
reveals that for most of the states, this ratio has been increasing during the time period,
with the most dependent states being Washington, California, District of Columbia, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Figure 22 also shows the variation of share of H-1B Population
across states in year 1992, 2017, and changes from 1992 to 2017 respectively, from the top
dependent state to the bottom.
Table 8: Top 10 dependent states on H-1B population in 1992 and 2017.
1992 2017 change (1992-2017)
Top 10 Dependent States
1 District of Columbia 0.3358% District of Columbia 0.5732% Washington 0.3083%
2 New Jersey 0.2425% New Jersey 0.4658% California 0.2800%
3 Delaware 0.2249% Washington 0.4452% District of Columbia 0.2374%
4 Massachusetts 0.1736% California 0.4222% New Jersey 0.2233%
5 Connecticut 0.1572% Delaware 0.3668% Pennsylvania 0.1780%
6 California 0.1422% Massachusetts 0.3511% Massachusetts 0.1776%
7 Washington 0.1370% Connecticut 0.2886% Illinois 0.1682%
8 New York 0.1228% Illinois 0.2795% New York 0.1422%
9 Texas 0.1200% New York 0.2650% Delaware 0.1419%
10 Georgia 0.1142% Pennsylvania 0.2617% Rhode Island 0.1402%
Bottom 10 Dependent States
42 Hawaii 0.0269% Oklahoma 0.0459% Maine 0.0198%
43 New Mexico 0.0260% South Dakota 0.0412% Louisiana 0.0179%
44 Oklahoma 0.0246% Louisiana 0.0377% West Virginia 0.0154%
45 Alaska 0.0204% Alabama 0.0316% South Dakota 0.0125%
46 Alabama 0.0202% Montana 0.0308% Alabama 0.0114%
47 Louisiana 0.0198% Hawaii 0.0280% Mississippi 0.0041%
48 Mississippi 0.0166% West Virginia 0.0277% Wyoming 0.0026%
49 Wyoming 0.0154% Mississippi 0.0207% Hawaii 0.0011%
50 West Virginia 0.0123% Alaska 0.0196% Nevada -0.0002%
51 Montana 0.0110% Wyoming 0.0180% Alaska -0.0007%
3.5 Empirical Framework
In this paper, I use probit regression model to estimate the possible impact of H-1B
visa reforms on US natives’ college major choices in STEM related fields. The estimating
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Figure 22: Distribution of share of H-1B population across states in 1992 and 2017.
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framework is
STEMist = I(α + β · ln(H-1B Sharest) + δXist + θZst + φs + ηt + εist ≥ 0), ε ∼ (0, 1).
Assume that traditionally students enter their college in age 18 and graduate in age 22.
The dependent variable equals 1 if individual i who was born in state s majored in STEM
fields when he or she was 18 or 22 years old in year t. H-1B Shares,t is the estimated H-1B
population in state s and year t as a percentage of the state population in state s and year t.
Xist represent the characteristics of individual i, including his or her age, age square, gender,
and dummy variables for race (white, black, Hispanic, Asian or other). When these variables
are included, they are controlling for any systematic differences in the probability of majoring
in STEM fields across different sub-groups. Lagged H-1B population share are also included.
For year t when individual was 18 years old, I include lagged H-1B population share for the
past 3 years, which should traditionally cover the individual’s high school education. Under
those specifications, I am trying to measure the possible impact of H-1B visa reforms on US
natives’ college major choices when they enter the college. And for year t when individual
was 22 years old, I include lagged H-1B population share for the past 5 years, which are
supposed to cover the individual’s college education. Therefore, under those specifications, I
am trying to measure the possible impact of H-1B visa reforms on US natives’ college major
choices when they graduate from college, which is a joint choice of major when they enter
and shift during the college.
Intuitively, the condition of STEM jobs market could also affect natives’ college major
choices in STEM fields. Therefore, Zst represent some specifications controlling for the STEM
labor market conditions. I use six different measures to control for the relative attractiveness
of STEM jobs, including variables that equal the proportion of college graduates working
in STEM occupations in state s and year t, the change of that proportion during the past
decade, the ratio of total personal income of college graduates being employed in STEM
occupations to that of college graduates in non-STEM occupations in state s and year t,
the change of that ratio in the past 10 years, the ratio of wage and salary income of college
graduates being employed in STEM occupations to that of college graduates in non-STEM
occupations in state s and year t, and the change of that ratio during the past decade. STEM
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occupations are defined based on the classifications in [65] paper, data source include 1980,
1990, 2000 census, and 2001 to 2017 ACS. Since the corresponding occupation codes change
from dataset to dataset, more details are provided in the Appendices Table 14.
The regression model also includes state and year fixed effects, and state-specific linear
time trends. The state-of-birth fixed effects control for any unobservable factors that are
specific to the state but constant over time, such as climate and location. The year fixed
effects control for any unobservable factors that are specific to that year, such as the macroe-
conomy condition and policy change. The state-specific linear time trend help control for
any unobservable, smooth changes within the state that might affect the likelihood that
US natives’ college major choices in STEM fields. The standard errors εist are robust and
clustered on the state.
3.5.1 Instrumental Variable Approach
The distribution of H-1B population across states might be endogenous, suffering from
the problem of self selection. Factors that affect the possibility of H-1B visa holders to live in
one certain state might also affect US natives’ college major choices in STEM related fields.
If those factors could not be completely captured by my labor market control variables,
state and year fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trend, the plain Probit regression
estimates will have an upward or downward bias. For example, an upward bias might accur
if the H-1B visa holders are attracted by a state with educational systems putting more
emphasis on STEM education and imposing policies to generate more STEM majors. On
the other side, if there are native families who work in STEM occupations and expect their
children to also disproportionately major in STEM majors, and decide to move away from
the state with a large number of H-1B population before their children are born, this will
end up with a downward bias for the plain Probit estimates.
To deal with this potential endogeneity problem, I will apply an instrumental variable
approach besides the plain Probit regression model. The instrument is based on the foreign-
born STEM workers’ historical settlement patterns. Previous studies have found out that
immigrants tend to settle in the same areas as earlier immigrants from their country of origin.
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Existing research using instruments for the immigrant share based on historical settlement
patterns include but are not limit to [28], [27], [72], [45], [75], etc. This is also well known as
the Bartik or shift-share instrument. Two recent papers by [42] and [46] look into the details
of this instrument, and provide some econometric and economic reasons to reconsider the
conditions under which it could be used. They emphasize that the initial shares need to be
exogenous, which is reasonable here because year 1980 was more than ten years before the
H-1B visa program getting started. According to the summary statistics of the H-1B visa
program, we can see that large proportion of H-1B visa holders are working in STEM related
occupations. Therefore, the historical settlement patterns of foreign-born STEM workers
before the H-1B visa program started might be a good instrument for the distribution of
H-1B population nowadays. My instrument variable is constructed by reallocating the H-
1B population across states based on the foreign-born STEM workers’ distribution, for 17
countries or regions of origin, across states in 1980. The 17 countries or regions are Africa,
India, China, Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Rest of Asia, United Kingdom, Germany,
France, Rest of Europe, Canada, Mexico, Rest of North America, Oceania, Brazil, and Rest
of South America. These 17 groups are chosen because according to the data provided
by Department of State (since 1997) and USCIS (since 2003), each group accounted for a
significant share of H-1B visa holders, and each group also accounted for a relatively large
share of foreign-born STEM workers in 1980. Therefore, this classification could avoid having
large numbers of zeros in my constructed instrumental variables. Recall that year 1980 was
more than ten years before the H-1B visa program getting started. Specifically, I compute
the predicted H-1B population share in state s and year t according to the following formula,









where j represents country or region of origin.
The underlying assumption for this instrument variable to be valid is that the distribution
of foreign-born STEM workers by country or region of origin across states in year 1980 is
not correlated with any factor that affect US natives’ college major choices in STEM related
fields occurring more than ten years later. In other words, shocks that affect the distribution
of foreign-born STEM workers in 1980 and US natives’ college major choices do not persist
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over time. This should be a reasonable assumption because year 1980 predates much of the
beginning of the H-1B visa program.
3.6 Results
Table 9 and Table 10 show the plain Probit regression results for the correlation between
H-1B population shares and US natives’ college major choices in STEM fields. And Table 11
and Table 12 report the instrumental variables results. For all the results tables, control
variables for personal characteristics and labor market conditions are included, as well as
state-of-birth fixed effect, year fixed effect, and state-specific linear trend. Besides the all
sample regression, I have also divided the full sample into different sub-groups according to
gender and race (White, Black, Hispanic and Asian), in order to see the possible impact of
H-1B visa reforms on college major choices of different subgroups. The totals for White,
Black, Hispanic and Asian do not sum to the full sample size because otherrace category
is not included. As explained in 3.5, lagged H-1B population shares are also included as
control variables. For Table 9 and Table 11, I am trying to measure the possible impact of
H-1B visa reforms on US natives’ major choices when they enter the college. Therefore, I am
looking at the coefficients when individuals are in their age 18, which is assumed to be the
traditional year of entering college. Lagged H-1B population shares for the past 3 years are
included, which normally cover students’ high school education. For Table 10 and Table 12,
I am trying to measure the possible impact of H-1B visa reforms on US natives’ major
choices when they graduate from college. Therefore, I am looking at the coefficients when
individuals are in their age 22, which is assumed to be the traditional year of graduation.
The major choices observed when they graduate are supposed to be a joint choice of majors
when they enter and make possible shift during the college. Lagged H-1B population shares
for the past 5 years are included, which usually cover students’ college education.
Recall that in a linear regression model, we could directly interpreting the estimated
coefficients as the marginal effects. But this is not the case for a probit regression model.
In general, we cannot interpret the coefficients from the output of a probit regression model
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in a standard way. The marginal effects of the regressors refer to how much the conditional
probability of the outcome variable changes when we change the value of a regressor, holding
all other regressors constant at some values. In particular, the marginal effects depend not
only on the regression coefficients, but also on the values of all the other regressors. Therefore,
in the probit regression model, there is an additional step of computation required to get the
marginal effects once we have computed the probit regression fit. In the result tables below,
I have listed both the outputs of the coefficients and the average marginal effects (both with
corresponding standard deviations) for the purpose of interpretation. Although these two
magnitude are different, their sign and significance level are definitely the same.
3.6.1 Plain Probit Results
From Table 9 we can see that for the full sample, there is no significant relationship
found between H-1B population shares and natives’ college major choices in STEM fields
when they enter the college at age 18. However, if I divide the full sample into different
gender and race subgroups, we can see that there are positive effects showing up for the
female and the White subgroups, and negative effect for the Hispanic subgroup. In other
words, given the choices made when they enter the college, the likelihood of female and
White native students choosing STEM majors have been positively affected by the H-1B
population shares, while the Hispanic subgroup have been adversely affected.
Further computation of the average marginal effects provide the information of interpret-
ing the magnitude of the impacts. For example, in my Probit regression model with the log
of H-1B population share as the explanatory variable, an estimated average marginal effect
of 0.0038 suggests that a 10% increase in the H-1B population share increases the proba-
bility of a female native student majoring in STEM fields when she enters the college by
0.038 percentage points. Similarly, an estimated average marginal effect of 0.0045 indicates
that a 10% increase in the H-1B population share will raise the likelihood of a White native
student choosing STEM majors when entering the college by as much as 0.045 percentage
points. And an estimated average marginal effect of -0.0212 suggests that a 10% increase in
the H-1B population share decreases the probability of a Hispanic native student majoring
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in STEM fields by 0.212%.
Table 10 shows the plain Probit regression results when students graduate from college
at age 22. We can see that no significant result has been found for the full sample or any
gender and race subgroup. Both the crowd-in and crowd-out effects found in subgroups
above when students enter the college have disappeared.
3.6.2 Instrumental Variables Results
Given the analysis in Section 3.5, we know that endogeneity of self-selection problem
might bias the plain Probit results positively or negatively. Therefore, a more preferred
specification would be the instrumental variable approach. Besides showing the regression
results of the IV approach of the probit model, both Table 11 and Table 12 also display the
F-test statistics from the first-stage of each IV regression. All the F-test statistics are well
above 10, which indicate that the instrument variable is valid and has a strong first-stage.
Table 11 reports the IV regression results when natives enter the college at their age 18.
We can see that the IV estimates are more negative compared to the plain Probit results,
which indicate that the coefficients of the plain Probit regression model might suffer from
upward bias. From the result table we can see that for the full sample, the H-1B population
shares adversely affects natives’ college major choices in STEM fields significantly at the 99%
confidence interval. A 10% increase in the H-1B population shares decreases the probability
of native students majoring in STEM fields when they enter the college by as large as 0.032
percentage points. If we take a further look at the impacts on different subgroups, we can see
that both male and the White subgroups have been negatively affected. A 10% increase in
the H-1B population share would decrease the likelihood of a male native student choosing
STEM majors by 0.07%, and decrease that of a White native student by 0.025%.
The implied marginal effects might be trivial at first glance. But recall that the H-
1B population share had increased dramatically during year 1992 to 2017, from 0.0954%
in 1992 to 0.2204% in 2017. Given that it had more than doubled during the period, the
probability of native students majoring in STEM fields when they enter the college would
be 0.74 percentage points larger - a nontrivial difference - if the H-1B population shares had
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remained at their 1992 levels and all else had remained the same. Similarly, the likelihood
of male native students choosing STEM majors would be 1.62 percentage points larger, and
that of White native students would be 0.58 percentage points larger.
The crowd-out effect remains for the whole sample as well as the male and White sub-
groups when natives graduate, and even the female and Asian subgroups are adversely
affected now. Compare to their major choices when entering the college, students might
have a better understanding of the job market they are facing and the career path they
are planning when graduation. Therefore, students might choose to change their college
majors by shifting to other fields during college education. The final decisions observed in
the data show negative estimates for both the full sample and different subgroups. From
Table 12 we can see that for the full sample, the H-1B population share adversely affects
natives’ college major choices in STEM fields significantly when they graduate. Referring
to the magnitude, a 10% increase in the H-1B population share decreases the probability of
natives choosing STEM fields when graduate by as large as 0.021 percentage points. When
we take a further look at the possible impacts on different gender and race subgroups, we
can see that more subgroups have been negatively affected. Female, male, White and Asian
subgroups have all been adversely affected by the H-1B population share. A 10% increase in
the H-1B population share could decrease the likelihood of a female native graduate major-
ing in STEM fields by 0.014%, decrease that of a male native graduate by a more significant
impact of 0.032%, and decrease that of a White native graduate by 0.02%. The native Asian
subgroup suffer from the most dramatic negative effect. The parameter estimate indicates
that a 10% increase in the H-1B population share would decrease the likelihood of an Asian
native graduate choosing STEM majors by as large as 0.111%.
Similarly, given that the H-1B population share had been more than doubled during
year 1992 to 2017, the probability of native students majoring in STEM fields when they
graduate from college would be 0.49 percentage points larger, if the H-1B population shares
had remained at their 1992 levels and all else had remained the same. The likelihood of
female native students choosing STEM majors when graduation would be 0.32 percentage
points larger, that of male native students would be 0.74 percentage points larger, and that
of White native students would be 0.46 percentage points larger. For the native Asian
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subgroups, the probability would have been as large as 2.56 percentage points larger if the
H-1B population shares had remained at their 1992 levels and all else had remained the same.
This is a dramatic difference, and since foreign-born Asian account for a large proportion of
H-1B visa holders, there might be an interesting “Asian crowd out Asian” story here.
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Table 9: Probit regression estimates for relationship between majoring in STEM and H-1B population share when entering
college.
% of H-1B population in: All Female Male White Black Hispanic Asian
Coefficients:
Age 18 0.0092 0.0171** 0.0004 0.0166** 0.0197 -0.0854** 0.0178
(0.0070) (0.0087) (0.0111) (0.0070) (0.0360) (0.0380) (0.0310)
Age 17 0.0016 0.0071 -0.0053 0.0012 0.0248 -0.0060 -0.0345
(0.0091) (0.0105) (0.0122) (0.0096) (0.0330) (0.0367) (0.0483)
Age 16 -0.0092 -0.0078 -0.0112 -0.0070 -0.0143 -0.0194 -0.0419
(0.0081) (0.0114) (0.0120) (0.0101) (0.0397) (0.0454) (0.0404)
Age 15 -0.0016 -0.0106 0.0064 -0.0021 0.0543* -0.0317 0.0224
(0.0088) (0.0098) (0.0145) (0.0093) (0.0314) (0.0375) (0.0406)
Average marginal effects:
Age 18 0.0025 0.0038** 0.0001 0.0045** 0.0050 -0.0212** 0.0064
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0038) (0.0019) (0.0091) (0.0094) (0.0111)
Age 17 0.0004 0.0016 -0.0018 0.0003 0.0063 -0.0015 -0.0123
(0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0041) (0.0026) (0.0083) (0.0091) (0.0173)
Age 16 -0.0025 -0.0017 -0.0038 -0.0019 -0.0036 -0.0048 -0.0150
(0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0041) (0.0027) (0.0100) (0.0112) (0.0145)
Age 15 -0.0004 -0.0024 0.0022 -0.0006 0.0137* -0.0078 0.0080
(0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0049) (0.0025) (0.0079) (0.0093) (0.0145)
# of obs 1,373,608 784,689 588,919 1,101,135 85,070 94,601 56,343
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Table 10: Probit regression for relationship between majoring in STEM and H-1B population share when graduation.
% of H-1B population in: All Female Male White Black Hispanic Asian
Coefficients:
Age 22 -0.0127 -0.0097 -0.0163 -0.0134 0.0344 -0.0290 -0.0569
(0.0097) (0.0096) (0.0129) (0.0089) (0.0265) (0.0350) (0.0469)
Age 21 -0.0093 -0.0022 -0.0163 -0.0091 -0.0538** 0.0231 0.0200
(0.0082) (0.0098) (0.0109) (0.0089) (0.0259) (0.0303) (0.0444)
Age 20 0.0056 0.0025 0.0086 0.0079 0.0320 -0.0603 -0.0131
(0.0090) (0.0104) (0.0116) (0.0100) (0.0359) (0.0376) (0.0361)
Age 19 -0.0174** -0.0157 -0.0192* -0.0187** -0.0134 0.0264 -0.0499*
(0.0087) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0090) (0.0397) (0.0339) (0.0292)
Age 18 0.0091 0.0176* -0.0008 0.0155** 0.0309 -0.0886*** 0.0186
(0.0066) (0.0095) (0.0109) (0.0071) (0.0332) (0.0313) (0.0355)
Average marginal effects:
Age 22 -0.0035 -0.0022 -0.0055 -0.0036 0.0087 -0.0072 -0.0203
(0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0044) (0.0024) (0.0067) (0.0086) (0.0168)
Age 21 -0.0025 -0.0005 -0.0055 -0.0025 -0.0136** 0.0057 0.0072
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0037) (0.0024) (0.0065) (0.0075) (0.0159)
Age 20 0.0015 0.0005 0.0029 0.0022 0.0081 -0.0149 -0.0047
(0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0091) (0.0093) (0.0129)
Age 19 -0.0047** -0.0035 -0.0065* -0.0051** -0.0034 0.0065 -0.0178*
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0036) (0.0024) (0.0100) (0.0084) (0.0104)
Age 18 0.0025 0.0039* -0.0003 0.0042** 0.0078 -0.0218*** 0.0067
(0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0037) (0.0019) (0.0084) (0.0077) (0.0127)
# of obs 1,627,098 925,293 701,805 1,312,411 102,196 108,507 61,990
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Table 11: IV regression for relationship between majoring in STEM and H-1B population share when entering college.
% of H-1B population in: All Female Male White Black Hispanic Asian
Coefficients:
Age 18 -0.1102*** -0.0443 -0.1917*** -0.0865* -0.1403 -0.1569 -0.2349
(0.0421) (0.0654) (0.0509) (0.0481) (0.1110) (0.1225) (0.2016)
Age 17 0.0381** 0.0260 0.0526*** 0.0309* 0.0936* 0.0222 0.0609
(0.0162) (0.0231) (0.0202) (0.0167) (0.0544) (0.0595) (0.0860)
Age 16 -0.0090 -0.0078 -0.0104 -0.0068 -0.0268 -0.0172 -0.0253
(0.0104) (0.0114) (0.0168) (0.0114) (0.0482) (0.0469) (0.0462)
Age 15 -0.0108 -0.0151 -0.0092 -0.0104 0.0525 -0.0386 -0.0042
(0.0110) (0.0108) (0.0174) (0.0114) (0.0337) (0.0398) (0.0477)
F-test 22.84 22.77 22.83 20.10 29.10 16.21 25.95
Average marginal effects:
Age 18 -0.0032*** -0.0010 -0.0070*** -0.0025* -0.0063 -0.0033 -0.0105
Age 17 0.0011** 0.0006 0.0019*** 0.0009* 0.0042* 0.0005 0.0027
Age 16 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0004 -0.0011
Age 15 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0024 -0.0008 -0.0002
# of obs 1,373,608 784,689 588,919 1,101,135 85,070 94,601 56,343
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Table 12: IV regression for relationship between majoring in STEM and H-1B population share when graduation.
% of H-1B population in: All Female Male White Black Hispanic Asian
Coefficients:
Age 22 -0.1636** -0.1434* -0.1952*** -0.1626** 0.0869 -0.1309 -0.7518**
(0.0638) (0.0861) (0.0745) (0.0682) (0.1703) (0.2260) (0.3117)
Age 21 0.0445 0.0458 0.0468 0.0417 -0.0801 0.0649 0.3316**
(0.0272) (0.0348) (0.0306) (0.0275) (0.0859) (0.0924) (0.1587)
Age 20 0.0115 0.0073 0.0161 0.0138 0.0349 -0.0552 0.0468
(0.0110) (0.0114) (0.0144) (0.0121) (0.0407) (0.0417) (0.0434)
Age 19 -0.0248** -0.0219* -0.0289** -0.0269** -0.0152 0.0207 -0.0900
(0.0108) (0.0118) (0.0135) (0.0111) (0.0429) (0.0439) (0.0551)
Age 18 0.0039 0.0130 -0.0067 0.0100 0.0358 -0.0872*** -0.0115
(0.0088) (0.0115) (0.0124) (0.0104) (0.0358) (0.0329) (0.0395)
F-test 18.80 18.14 19.62 17.64 19.01 11.96 19.85
Average marginal effects:
Age 22 -0.0021** -0.0014* -0.0032*** -0.0020** 0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0111**
Age 21 0.0006 0.0005 0.0008 0.0005 -0.0013 0.0008 0.0049**
Age 20 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0007 0.0007
Age 19 -0.0003** -0.0002* -0.0005** -0.0003** -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0013
Age 18 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 -0.0011*** -0.0002
# of obs 1,627,098 925,293 701,805 1,312,411 102,196 108,507 61,990
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper measures the possible impacts of H-1B visa reforms on US natives’ college
major choices in STEM related fields. In this study I have built a bridge between H-1B
visa program related literatures and college major choices related literatures. Given the
endogeneity problem of self-selection, I have constructed an instrumental variable of H-1B
population share based on historical settlement pattern of foreign-born STEM workers. I find
significant negative impacts of H-1B population shares on natives majoring in STEM fields,
both when they enter the college and graduate from it. For students beginning their college
education, a 10% increase in the H-1B population share decreases the probability of native
students choosing STEM majors by 0.032%. If we take a further look at different gender and
race subgroups, a 10% increase in the H-1B population share could decrease the likelihood
of a male native student majoring in STEM related fields by 0.07%, and decrease that of a
White native student by 0.025%. Given that the H-1B population share had been more than
doubled from year 1992 to 2017, the probability of native students majoring in STEM fields
when they enter the college would be 0.74 percentage points larger, if the H-1B population
shares had remained at their 1992 levels and all else had remained the same. Similarly, the
likelihood of male native students choosing STEM majors would be 1.62 percentage points
larger, and that of White native students would be 0.58 percentage points larger.
For students graduating from college, their reported majors are a joint choice of entering
and shifting during college. Results indicate that a 10% increase in the H-1B population
share decreases the probability of native graduates choosing STEM majors by 0.021%. When
we take a further look at different subgroups, a 10% increase in the H-1B population share
could decrease the likelihood of a female native graduate majoring in STEM related fields
by 0.014%, decrease that of a male native graduate by 0.032%, and decrease that of a White
native graduate by 0.02%. The native Asian subgroup suffer from the most dramatic crowd-
out effect. A 10% increase in the H-1B population share could decrease the likelihood of
an Asian native graduate majoring in STEM related fields by as large as 0.111%. Again,
given that the H-1B population share had been more than doubled, the probability of native
graduates majoring in STEM fields when they graduate would be 0.49 percentage points
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larger, if the H-1B population shares had remained at their 1992 levels and all else had
remained the same. Similarly, the likelihood of female native graduates choosing STEM
majors would be 0.32 percentage points larger, that of male native graduates would be 0.74
percentage points larger, and that of White native graduates would be 0.46 percentage points
larger. For the native Asian subgroups, the probability would have been as large as 2.56
percentage points larger if the H-1B population shares had remained at their 1992 levels and
all else had remained the same. Since foreign-born Asian account for a large proportion of
H-1B visa holders, there might be an interesting “Asian crowd out Asian” story here.
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Appendix A Additional Lemmas and Proofs for Chapter 2
The following lemma is a simplified version of Matrix Chernoff inequality, cited from [81,
Eq. (5.1.5)].
Lemma 4. Let X1, · · · , Xm be a sequence of d×d i.i.d. positive semi-definite (PSD) matrices















where λmin(·) is the smallest eigenvalue of a PSD matrix and µmin = λmin(
∑
j EXj).
The next lemma upper bounds the operator norm of an inverse covariance matrix of
random vectors uniformly distributed on a unit sphere.
Lemma 5. Let u1, u2, · · · , um be i.i.d. d-dimensional vectors uniformly distributed on the
unit sphere {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖2 = 1}. Suppose also that m ≥ 8d ln(d/δ) for some δ ∈ (0, 1/2].






Proof. Proof of Lemma 5. Denote Λ := E[u1u>1 ] ∈ Rd×d. Because the distribution of
u1 is spherical invariant, we immediately have Λjk = 0 for all j 6= k and Λjj ≡ λ for all






















Under the condition that m ≥ 8d ln(d/δ), the right-hand side of the above inequality is upper
bounded by δ. Lemma 5 is thus proved.
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Appendix B Additional Data for Chapter 3
Table 13: STEM major classifications.
ACS Code Major Name
1103 Animal Sciences
1104 Food Science




21XX Computer and Information Sciences
24XX Engineering
25XX Engineering Technologies
36XX Biology and Life Sciences
37XX Mathematics and Statistics
3801 Military Technologies
4002 Nutrition Sciences
4005 Mathematics and Computer Science
4006 Cognitive Science and Biopsychology
50XX Physical Sciences
5102 Nuclear, Industrial Radiology, and Biological Technologies
5206 Social Psychology
6105 Medical Technologies Technicians
6108 Pharmacy, Pharmaceutical Sciences, and Administration
6202 Actuarial Science
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Table 14: STEM occupation classifications.
Occupation Codes
Occupation 1980/90 2000 2001-2009 2010-2017
census census ACS ACS
Actuaries 66 120 1200 1200
Aerospace engineers 44 132 1320 1320
Agricultural and food scientists 77 160 1600 1600
Airplane pilots and navigators 226 903 9030 9030
Atmospheric and space scientists 74 171 1710 1710
Biological scientists 78 161 1610 1610
Biological technicians 223 191 1910 1910
Chemical engineers 48 135 1350 1350
Chemical technicians 224 192 1920 1920
Chemists 73 172 1720 1720
Civil engineers 53 136 1360 1360
Clinical laboratory technologies and technicians 203 330 3300 3300
Computer software developers 229 102 1020 1020
Computer systems analysts and computer scientists 64 100 1000 1006
Dentists 85 301 3010 3010
Dietitians and nutritionists 97 303 3030 3030
Electrical engineers 55 141 1410 1410
Geologists 75 193 1930 1930
Industrial engineers 56 143 1430 1430
Management analysts 26 71 710 710
Mathematicians and mathematical scientists 68 124 1240 1240
Mechanical engineers 57 146 1460 1460
Medical scientists 83 165 1650 1650
Metallurgical and materials engineers, variously phrased 45 145 1450 1450
Not-elsewhere-classified engineers 59 153 1530 1530
Occupational therapists 99 315 3150 3150
Optometrists 87 304 3040 3040
Other health and therapy 89 326 3260 3260
Petroleum, mining, and geological engineers 47 152 1520 1520
Pharmacists 96 305 3050 3050
Physical scientists, n.e.c. 76 176 1760 1760
Physical therapists 103 316 3160 3160
Physicians 84 306 3060 3060
Physicians’ assistants 106 311 3110 3110
Physicists and astronomers 69 170 1700 1700
Podiatrists 88 312 3120 3120
Psychologists 167 182 1820 1820
Sales engineers 258 493 4930 4930
Social scientists, n.e.c. 169 186 1860 1860
Speech therapists 104 323 3230 3230
Subject instructors (high school/college) 154 220 2200 2200
Therapists, n.e.c. 105 324 3240 3245
Veterinarians 86 325 3250 3250
Vocational and educational counselors 163 200 2000 2000
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